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This thesis addresses the logistical support issues of a United States Marine Corps 
distributed operations platoon which will be deployed with a Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) in late 2006.  This summary gives a broad overview of distributed operations 
(DO), the research methodology, and focuses on conclusions and recommendations 
stemming from this research.  This analysis is designed to support the development of 
concepts, tactics, and procedures which will make the DO platoon concept more robust 
and effective.  
DO is a transformational USMC initiative, directed by the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps, General Hagee (Hagee, July 2005).  It is an additive capability to support 
the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare philosophy by enabling operations which are 
further forward, more dispersed, and intelligence driven.  The DO platoon leverages 
advanced sensors, communications, training, and fire support to accomplish a wide range 
of missions and put the enemy at a disadvantage.  The DO platoon concept is based on 
the Marine rifle platoon table of organization (T/O 1013G, 1999) with the addition of 
vehicles, sensors, radios, crew served weapons, and some modifications to platoon 
command and control structure.  The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) is 
developing a DO platoon for deployment with MEU in 2006.  Logistically, the essential 
character of a DO platoon is that it lacks secure lines of communications.  It must be able 
to operate over extended time periods.  The additional risk presented by these facts 
necessitates a robust support concept that addresses the unique characteristics and 
requirements of a DO platoon. 
This analysis answers three questions in order to help the Marine Corps solve the 
problem of logistically supporting DO.  They are: 
• What are the critical logistical factors relating to mission success for the 
DO platoon in the missions envisioned in MCWL’s Wargame Scenarios? 
• What are the critical logistical capabilities of the MEU that will enable it 
to provide continuous sustainment to a distributed force? 
 xxii
• What is the supportability of a DO platoon across the range of missions? 
These questions are addressed using simulation, statistical analysis, and 
requirements determination.  In the process of answering these questions, this thesis 
determines if a current MEU can support DO in 2006, and establishes a baseline of 
simulated operational experience to help make logisticians more proficient at supporting 
these types of operations.  The motivation behind this analysis is to ensure that Marine 
warfighters have the support they need, when they need it. 
The simulation model used in this analysis is based on a scenario from MCWL’s 
DO Seminar Wargame held in November 2004.  This scenario requires the DO platoon to 
prevent enemy infiltration across a six kilometer border region in rugged terrain for a one 
or two week mission.  If the DO platoon’s subordinate units are compromised or run out 
of supplies, they are rendered nearly ineffective until a support mission arrives.  As a 
result, the measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the percent of enemy killed over the course 
of the mission.  The simulation is implemented in the MANA agent-based combat 
modeling environment, which is part of the Marine Corps’ Project Albert suite of models 
(MCWL Project Albert Website, March 2005).   
The purpose of the simulation model is to experiment with various logistical 
systems through a technique called data farming.  This technique leverages high 
performance computing to generate large numbers of data points.  The input logistical 
parameters are varied systematically in an efficient way to broadly explore the 
consequences of various logistical policies and the interactions between various factors 
such as days of supply (DOS), resupply speed, rapid request setup time, and others.  The 
simulation experiment produced over 200,000 data points using more than 700 CPU days 
computer time in a matter of a few weeks. 
The analysis of the simulation output was used to identify the most critical 
characteristics of a logistical support system, thereby answering the first two research 
questions.  Overall, responsiveness is the key logistical criteria for success for long term 
DO platoon operations.  Answering the first research question, the most critical logistical 
factors are responsiveness, combat usage rate, and DOS.  Answering the second research 
question, the critical capabilities are as follows: 
 xxiii
• The DO platoon must have the capacity to carry at least three DOS.  
• The CSS agency must have the ability to sustain scheduled resupply 
deliveries at least every two days. 
• The CSS agency must be assigned dedicated, responsive, high speed 
delivery means.  
• An anticipatory (or sense and respond) logistics system should launch 
missions twelve hours ahead of a predicted stock out or equipment failure. 
• Resupply deliveries must be accomplished quickly, stealthily, or with 
heavy security (or a combination of all three). 
• Logistical responsiveness, intelligence, aerial surveillance, and fire 
support are critical for unstable or extremely dangerous missions. 
• The best performing logistics system (based on those modeled and 
analyzed) combines rapid request, fast delivery, aerial surveillance, a 
scheduled resupply rate, three or more DOS capacity, and a sense and 
respond logistics capability. 
Following the analysis of the simulation data, this thesis determines the physical 
requirements of the DO platoon based on standard planning factors and the author’s 
operational experience as a logistician in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Using existing MEU 
assets, a support plan is developed that is feasible and addresses the lessons learned from 
the data analysis.  This results in a robust and responsive logistical support concept.  This 
concept is summarized as follows: 
• The DO platoon should carry three DOS and combat ammunition load. 
• Two CH-46s should be assigned in direct support, transporting supplies 
internally. 
• Two AH-1Ws should be assigned for escort and landing zone security. 
• Two DOS resupply packages pre-staged and organized into fire team sized 
packages 
• CSS agency should be located within 55 kilometers of the DO platoon. 
• Pilots, aircraft, and supply and ammunition packages should be on standby 
to keep response time less than four hours. 
• CSS agency should remain in continuous contact with DO platoon in order 
to track requirements and respond to demands. 
Using this concept as a foundation, the third research question is answered.  A DO 
platoon is currently logistically supportable across a wide range of missions, provided 
 xxiv
that the MEU is willing to commit the necessary resources, which are substantial, to 
support one platoon.  Synthesizing all the lessons learned from this analysis, the 
following recommendations are made: 
• Water is the biggest limiting factor in increasing DOS for the DO platoon.  
It is recommended that research be done into ways to reduce the water 
requirement by reclaiming waste water and capturing the water in engine 
exhaust. 
• The DO platoon could be resupplied by air delivery provided it is in range 
of casualty evacuation aircraft.  It is recommended that technologies for 
precision airdrop from the C-130 or MV-22 be explored for delivering 
tactical resupply packages to DO units in a clandestine manner. 
• The risk of a DO platoon operation increases with the length of time it 
takes for supporting aircraft to reach it.  This research estimates that a 15 
minute or less time of flight is effective and gives an operational radius of 
approximately 50 kilometers using the CH-46. Poor flight conditions or 
bad weather may limit this radius. It is recommended that operational 
constraints for DO be developed that account for the travel time of aircraft 
carrying critical supplies or performing medical evacuation.   
• Aerial surveillance of the DO platoon’s area during resupply deliveries 
proved to be very valuable in the simulation model.  It is recommended 
that a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle be considered for employment with 
the DO platoon. 
• Autonomic logistics is useful in supporting the DO platoon in the 
simulation, but a responsive rapid request system is more critical overall in 
responding to high demand variability.  It is recommended that 
intelligence and communications assets of the supporting agency be 
tailored to provide the maximum amount intelligence on usage rates and 
enemy activity in order to provide the supporting agency maximum 
flexibility in executing both push and pull logistics. 
The result of this analysis is not merely an answer to whether or not a DO platoon 
is currently supportable.  The body of this research provides a valuable reference tool to 
logisticians who will support DO in the future.  The lessons learned, the data gathered, 
and the calculations performed provide a good foundation for planning effective support 
concepts for a DO platoon mission. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Successful implementation of the distributed operations concept requires enhancements 
in C2, intelligence, fires, mobility, sustainment, and training/education.*
       BGen Robert E. Schmidle, USMC 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Marine Corps is continuously developing new tactics, techniques, and 
procedures that complement emerging technologies in order to make the Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) more lethal and efficient across the spectrum of missions.  
This development is part and parcel to the Department of Defense’s general concept of 
transforming the military into a force that is more capable of performing the missions of 
the 21st century.  Along with Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) and Sea-basing, the 
Marine Corps is looking very closely at a new infantry capability called “Distributed 
Operations.”  Distributed operations (DO) will represent a significant improvement in the 
training and equipment of Marine Corps infantry units, as well as a significant capability 
to influence the battlefield.   
The Marine Corps is currently developing the equipment, doctrine, tactics, 
techniques, and procedures that will define how DO will work.  One of the major players 
in this development is the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL).  MCWL is currently 
developing the concept for a DO platoon which will achieve initial operating capability 
with a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deploying in 2006.  MCWL held a wargame in 
November 2004 to explore the missions, organization, and capabilities of a DO platoon.  
The preliminary results of this first wargame indicate that a DO platoon will likely need 
to operate independently for up to two weeks in order to have a significant impact on the 
area of operations (Goulding 2004, page 4).  As a result, a major determining factor for 




* Quote taken from “Distributed Operations: From the Sea” by BGen Robert E. Schmidle, published in 
the Marine Corps Gazette, July 2004. 
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B. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
DO is envisioned as an additive capability that will greatly improve the efficacy 
of traditional Marine infantry units. This is a concept in its infancy, and as such, the 
accompanying doctrine, tactics, and organization are currently being developed by the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), the Expeditionary Force Development Center 
(EFDC), and numerous other agencies within the Marine Corps.  Several projects have 
been launched to help solve many of the problems associated with implementing and 
developing the DO concept.  At MCWL, both the Sea Viking division and the Project 
Albert division have been working on projects which will help senior leaders synthesize 
advice from analysts and subject matter experts into a robust concept.  The primary 
motivation for this thesis is a desire to take the work of Project Albert and the Sea Viking 
Division and use it as a foundation for an analysis of the logistical supportability of this 
emerging concept. 
As a result of the first DO Wargame sponsored by MCWL in November 2004, a 
new definition of the concept was put forward by the participants as a: 
Technique that deploys tactical units across the depth and breadth of a 
battlespace in order to maximize opportunities to achieve favorable 
intelligence driven engagements. This is enabled by a robust and easily 
accessible backbone of C2 and prompt, responsive fires. (Wilson and 
Stephens 2004, page 1) 
This represents an additive capability that will improve the ability of infantry to 
accomplish a wide range of missions across a much larger area of responsibility (AOR).  
While on the surface this definition may not seem to indicate much of a change from 
current doctrine, it indicates a major improvement in infantry capabilities that leverages 
technological advances and enhanced training to create a more lethal force. 
The current concept proposed by MCWL for a DO platoon creates three squads 
with three fire teams. Two fire teams of each squad are combat teams and one is a 
headquarters and fire support team.  The squads report to the platoon commander who 
reports to the MAGTF Commander or whoever has overall responsibility for the Area of 
Operations (AO).  The distributed platoon will have the capability to operate far forward 
in a widely dispersed manner while collecting intelligence, controlling fires, and shaping 
the battlespace.  These units will have no ground lines of communication and likely will 
need to be resupplied by aviation.  The distributed platoon will need the capability to 
operate over extended periods of time.  In order to facilitate missions of fourteen days or 
longer, a DO platoon will need a robust support concept that will rely heavily on air 
delivery and assault support.  Figure 1 shows the proposed organization of the DO 
platoon, which is based on a modification of the current Marine platoon organization.   
(Corbett, 2004) 
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Figure 1.   The current organization of a Marine Corps DO platoon. (from Corbett, 
2004) 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this thesis is to do a thorough quantitative analysis of the logistical 
issues pertaining to the combat service support of a DO platoon.  While this analysis is by 
no means exhaustive, the following questions will be addressed: 
• What are the critical logistical factors relating to mission success for the 
DO platoon in the missions envisioned in MCWL’s Wargame Scenarios? 
• What are the critical logistical capabilities of the MEU that will enable it 
to provide continuous sustainment to a distributed force? 
• What is the supportability of a DO platoon across the range of missions? 
3 
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This thesis uses simulation, data analysis, requirements determination, and other 
techniques to investigate these questions and develop a preliminary concept of support 
for a DO platoon. 
 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study provides the Marine Corps with analysis support for the development 
of future tactics, techniques, and procedures for supporting units operating in a 
distributed environment. Additionally, it gives insights on the most important factors 
relating to force effectiveness that will enable leaders to make better acquisition and force 
structure decisions.  The simulated operational experience that this analysis provides will 
help future logisticians to effectively support DO platoon operations.  Ultimately, this 
thesis produces the means to develop an estimate of logistical supportability for a Marine 
DO platoon mission based on sound quantitative analysis that will support further 
concept development and experimentation. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses multiple quantitative analysis techniques in order to develop an 
estimate of logistical supportability for a DO platoon across a spectrum of operations 
envisioned by developers at MCWL.  The foundation of the analysis is an agent-based 
computer simulation that is used to identify the critical logistical factors that affect 
mission success.  Once these factors are identified, the results are used to develop a 
preliminary logistical estimate of supportability that accounts for these critical factors.  
This estimate is based on a combination of traditional logistical requirements 
determination, simulation analysis results, and principles of robust design.  The ultimate 
motivation for this thesis is the need for a DO unit that is not only effective in its 
missions, but also supportable and flexible enough to be a ready tool for the MAGTF 
commander. 
This thesis uses an agent-based distillation, which is a type of computer 
simulation which attempts to model the critical factors of interest in combat without 
explicitly modeling all of the physical details.  The tool used is MANA (Map Aware 
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Non-Uniform Automata), which is in the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s Project Albert 
suite of analysis tools (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab [MCWL] Project Albert Website, 
2005).  The methodology is to develop a realistic scenario based on MCWL’s Sea Viking 
wargame with distributed operations.  This scenario is then replicated in the simulation 
tool and then analyzed.  The analysis process uses a technique called data farming, which 
is the major thrust of Project Albert.  This involves using high performance computing to 
run the simulations thousands of times while simultaneously varying many input 
parameters. Using cutting edge experimental designs developed at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, the data resulting from these simulations is analyzed identifying 
critical factors, interactions, and thresholds (Cioppa, 2002).  The results of the statistical 
analysis are then used to support the development of a logistical estimate of 
supportability for a DO platoon.  The final product is a preliminary concept of support 




























II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The foundation of any solid military analysis is a realistic scenario that will stress 
the system of interest.  This chapter begins with a brief introduction to the concept of a 
DO platoon, which is followed by the scenario that forms the basis of this study. This 
scenario is introduced in a manner consistent with the experience of most military 
professionals.  Following a description of the scenario is a brief description of the MANA 
simulation tool that is used to model and analyze the scenario.  Finally, this chapter 
culminates with a detailed description of the behavior of the simulation model. 
 
B.  WHAT IS A DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS PLATOON? 
 
1. Overview  
In chapter one, the concept of a DO platoon is introduced, but one may wonder 
how it is different from a traditional infantry platoon.  Put simply, the DO platoon is a 
necessary first step forward in equipping, training, and supporting infantry units to be 
more flexible for missions in the future.  According to General Hagee, the current 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, in a message addressed to all Marines, 
implementation of DO 
...will require a focus on enhanced small units: more autonomous, more 
lethal, and better able to operate across the full spectrum of operations.  
This will require investing in the technologies and training that will 
provide individual communications, tactical mobility, and networked 
intelligence down to the squad level.  Our logistics and fires capabilities 
must be adaptive and scalable in order to support these small units, 
whether dispersed across the battle space or aggregated for larger 
operations. (Hagee, 2005) 
As a concept, it is not limited to the platoon level, but could potentially scale 
much higher, even to the company, battalion, or regimental level.  DO is not simply a 
new doctrinal organization or a new suite of equipment. It is a synthesis of new 
equipment, training, doctrine, and tactics that will make the current Marine Corps 
infantry unit more flexible and lethal. In this section, the proposed organization and 
equipment for a DO platoon will be covered in more detail.  
 
2. Organization 
The DO platoon is based directly on the current table of organization for an 
infantry platoon.  The current infantry platoon has one headquarters element of four 
personnel (five with corpsman) and three squads (13 per squad) with three fire teams (4 
per team) in each squad.  The platoon’s end strength is one officer and 42 enlisted.  The 
platoon is augmented with a Navy corpsman from the battalion’s aid station platoon to 
make the total strength 44 personnel.  The proposed table of organization for a DO 
platoon, shown in Figure 2, also has 44 personnel including the corpsman. (Marine Rifle 
Company Table of Organization, October 1999)  
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Figure 2.   The current organization of a Marine Corps DO platoon reproduced from 
Chapter 1. (from Corbett, 2004) 
 
The DO platoon is a reorganization of the current structure.  Using the same 
number of Marines, the distributed platoon has two headquarters elements with redundant 
functions to facilitate command and control over a wider area.  To facilitate advanced 
communication and fire support abilities, each squad has a command and control cell 
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which operates the communication equipment and acts as a fire support team.  To make 
up for the personnel in the command and control organizations, there are only two fire 
teams per squad, for a total of six fire teams per platoon, as opposed to the current 
organization of nine fire teams per platoon.  The trade off is in advanced training, 
communication, sensors, fire support, and lethality, which should make the distributed 
platoon more lethal. (Corbett, 2004) 
  
Figure 3.   The equipment for the A and B command groups of the DO platoon. (from 




The equipment of a DO platoon is considerably more advanced than the current 
infantry platoon, especially in communications and sensors.  The basic weapons for the 
platoon, like the M-16 rifle, M-203 grenade launcher, and the M249 Squad Automatic 
Weapon, remain the same as the current infantry platoon. However, the addition of 
vehicles allows the distributed platoon to carry several heavy automatic weapons, like the 
M2 .50 caliber machine gun and the Mk-19 automatic 40mm grenade launcher.  The 
distributed platoon is by no means limited to operating from its vehicles, but the 
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increased firepower of crew served weapons relies heavily on the use of the Internally 
Transportable Vehicle (ITV). The ITV is transportable aboard all Marine transport 
helicopters, including the MV-22 Osprey.  It provides increased mobility, firepower, and 
sustainment for the platoon.  The biggest advances, however, are in the communications, 
sensing, and targeting equipment.   
 Billet Equipment Description Technology RangeA Command
Plt Commander
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
ETCS/Voice Expeditionary Tactical Comm System Low Earth Orbit Sattelite Worldwide
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi) 7-10mi
Plt Radio Operator
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 117 Squad-Plt-HHQ , CAS, Firecontrol - digital VHF(7-10mi)/UHF(LOS)/Sattelite (WW) 7-10mi
Rifleman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms 500-1000m
Guide
M-16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
PRC 150 Platoon to HHQ comms OTH (logistics) HF/HFDigital 30+ miles
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
ITV Internally Transportable Vehicle Can be transported inside MV-22
PAS-13H Optic for .50 caliber MG
M-2HB .50 Caliber Machine Gun 1830m
Medical Kit Standard First Aid Supplies
B Command Plt Sergeant
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
ETCS/Voice Expeditionary Tactical Comm System Low Earth Orbit Sattelite Worldwide
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi) 7-10mi
Rifleman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 117 Squad-Plt-HHQ , CAS, Firecontrol - digital VHF(7-10mi)/UHF(LOS)/Sattelite (WW) 7-10mi
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
Corpsman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Adv. Medkit Corpman emergency trauma kit
ITV Internally Transportable Vehicle Can be transported inside MV-22
PAS-13H Optic for Mk-19
MK-19 Automatic 40mm Grenade Launcher 1500m
Medical Kit Standard First Aid Supplies
M16A4 Rifleman suite consists of:
PRR, Bayonet, Bipod, Compass, White/IR Light, 
Suppressor, Bayonet, Collapsable Stock, Day RCO, Night 
RCO
 
Figure 4.   Detailed explanation of the characteristics of command group equipment. 
(after Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Sea Viking Website, 2005) 
 
 With long range scopes that are effective both day and night combined with 
advanced communications and laser designators, the distributed platoon is capable of 
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observing and coordinating all types of joint fires. The new suite of sensors for the 
distributed platoon allows it to maintain observation out to the maximum range of its 
weapons both day and night.  Figures 3 through 6 show the equipment of the DO platoon 
in great detail. (Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Sea Viking Website, 2005) 
 
Figure 5.   The equipment of the squad, of which there are three. Notice the large 
amount of communications equipment. (from Sea Viking 06 Distributed 









Squad Organization (3 per platoon)
Billet Equipment Description Technology Range
Squad C2
Squad Leader SGT
M16 w/ M203 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite and 40mm grenade launcher
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi)
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
ETCS/Voice Expeditionary Tactical Comm System Low Earth Orbit Sattelite Worldwide
Automatic Rifleman
M249 SAW 5.56 Machine Gun w/ spare barrel 1000m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
ITV
M240G 7.62 Machine Gun 1800m
PVS-17 Night Sight
PRC 117 Squad-Plt-HHQ , CAS, Firecontrol - digital VHF(7-10mi)/UHF(LOS)/Sattelite (WW)
GLTD II Ground Laser Target Designator 10x magnification 20km
Medical Kit Standard First Aid Supplies
Team 1
Team Leader CPL
M16 w/ M203 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite and 40mm grenade launcher 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi)
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
Automatic Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M249 SAW 5.56 Machine Gun w/ spare barrel
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
ITV
M-2HB .50 Caliber Machine Gun 1830m
PAS-13H Optic for M-2
Team 2
Team Leader CPL
M16 w/ M203 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite and 40mm grenade launcher 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi)
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
Automatic Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M249 SAW 5.56 Machine Gun w/ spare barrel 1000m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
ITV
MK-19 Autmatic 40mm Grenade Launcher 1500m
PAS-13H Optic for Mk-19  
Figure 6.   The squad equipment list with capabilities. Each squad has the 
communications and laser designators to be an effective fire support team. 








Figure 7.   List of additive capabilities of a DO platoon.  (from Sea Viking 06 
Distributed Operations Live Force Experimentation 25 Feb 05) 
 
4. Additional Capabilities 
According to the table of organization, the mission of a Marine Infantry Platoon, 
also known as a Rifle Platoon, “is to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and 
maneuver, or to repel his assault by fire and close combat.” (Marine Rifle Company 
Table of Organization, October 1999) This is also the mission of the Rifle Company of 
which the platoon is a part.  The current concept of employment of an infantry company 
is as a maneuver element of the infantry battalion, but it does have limited capability to 
operate independently with appropriate attachments.  Under existing doctrine, the platoon 
does not normally operate independently.  The DO concept provides additive capabilities 
to the rifle platoon that will enable it to operate independently across a wide spectrum of 
missions.  Figure 7 shows a brief summary of the additional capabilities of the DO 
platoon.  For the scenario that will be presented in the next section, the major capabilities 
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being utilized are to secure key terrain, control key avenues of approach, and interdict 
enemy forces. 
 
C. SCENARIO DESCRIPTION  
 









Figure 8.   The basic geography of the scenario based on California geography. (from 
MCWL Sea Viking 2006 Distributed Operations Wargame 1 CD-ROM, 
November 2004) [Best viewed in color] 
 
1. Overview 
To conduct a simulation study, it is necessary to draw from realistic operational 
scenarios that will allow the analyst to measure factors of interest in a way that is sensible 
to decision makers.  For this thesis, the basic outline for the scenario was obtained from 
MCWL’s Sea Viking 2006 DO Wargame #1 held in Quantico, VA in November 2004.  
In the second scenario from the war game, the mission of the DO platoon was to conduct 
surveillance and interdiction along a border similar to the situation along the border of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The purpose of this section of the thesis is to relate that 
scenario to potential consumers of this research in order to provide a strong foundation 
for the subsequent analysis. What follows is a brief synopsis of the scenario which forms 
the basis of the simulation models. Figure 8 shows the basic geography of the region in 
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question.  (MCWL Sea Viking 2006 Distributed Operations Wargame 1 CD-ROM, 
November 2004).   
 
2. General Situation 
The United States and its allies have recently liberated the country of Panacea 
from an Islamist regime that sponsored acts of terrorism on the U.S. and other Western 
Nations.  The situation is beginning to stabilize as the new government takes over, but 
opium production, pockets of former regime loyalists and terrorist warlords continue to 
be a major problem. Currently there is a significant problem of terrorist movement along 
the northeastern border between Panacea and Utopia, which is shown in Figure 9.  
Coalition forces in Panacea consist mainly of military advisors and aviation support to 
the Panacean fledgling military. 







12K  X  12K
Jamal Al Hasrah
• Illegally smuggles arms across border.
• Drug running also prevalent.
• Fiercely opposed to current government.
  
Figure 9.   Infiltration into Panacea from Utopia through the Bridgeport corridor is a 
significant problem. (from MCWL Sea Viking 2006 Distributed Operations 





3. Special Situation 
a. Enemy  
Human intelligence reporting indicates that a splinter group known as 
Jamal Al Hasrah (JAH), led by a previous warlord and insurgent, intends to capitalize on 
the ever growing drug trade and the challenges now posed for transnational terrorist 
movement in and out of Panacea by Panacea’s strong alliances and borders with 
Kimjongila, Cuswakia, and Iwalkin.  This splinter group mainly operates in the 
Bridgeport corridor using this area as a staging area, link up point, and access point for 
the passage of transnational terrorists, drug money for funding terrorism, and arms. 
Intelligence assesses that the JAH uses the Utopia/Panacea border region as a safe haven 
and the Bridgeport corridor as their main mobility corridor for movement in and out of 
Panacea.  The enemy’s most likely course of action, shown in Figure 10, is to infiltrate 
through the Bridgeport corridor using its knowledge of the terrain to avoid detection and 
engagement with coalition forces. 
 
Figure 10.   This picture shows the enemy’s most likely course of action (from MCWL 
Sea Viking 2006 Distributed Operations Wargame 1 CD-ROM, November 






The coalition commander and the Panacean government have decided to 
take the offensive.  One of the forces at their disposal is an Expeditionary Strike Group 
with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit.  The MEU commander has tasked the DO 
platoon with the mission of interdicting terrorist traffic coming into Panacea from Utopia 
in the Bridgeport corridor.  The MEU C-130 detachment is ashore based at Twenty-Nine 
Palms in Panacea. 
 
4. Mission 
The mission of the DO platoon is to locate and interdict insurgent forces operating 
in the border region between Panacea and Utopia in order to block the flow of drugs, 
arms, and terrorists into Panacea. 
 
5. Execution 
The DO platoon will establish three squad patrol bases at maximum dispersion in 
order to cover the entire Bridgeport corridor with observation and fires. Squads will 
conduct patrols in the vicinity of patrol bases to ensure adequate coverage of the diverse 
terrain. The platoon will make maximum use of long range indirect fires to harass and kill 
the enemy.  It will remain in place for an extended period (one to two weeks) in order to 
gain familiarity with the environment and operating characteristics of the enemy.  The 
basic scheme of maneuver is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.   This figure shows the deployment of the DO platoon and supporting artillery as 
modeled in the computer simulation. (after MCWL Sea Viking 2006 Distributed 
Operations Wargame 1 CD-ROM, November 2004)  [Best viewed in color] 
 
6. Administration and Logistics 
The DO platoon will be resupplied by aviation assault support via landing zones 
in the vicinity of their patrol bases.  This support will come from the MEU Aviation 
Combat Element in the form of helicopters or air delivery by C-130.  Medical 
evacuations will be conducted by helicopter.  The CSS supporting agency is located 
approximately 50 kilometers from the DO platoon.  There will be no ground lines of 
communication. 
 
7. Command and Signal 
The DO platoon will maintain a common operational picture and submit fire 
support and logistics requests using organic VHF, UHF, and HF radios and satellite 
communications.  The Expeditionary Tactical Communication System (see Figure 4) has 
worldwide range, so communications range is not a limiting factor the DO platoon in this 
analysis.  Each squad reports positions and contacts to the headquarters elements.  For the 
purpose of this scenario, who the platoon reports to is not important, but it is assumed 
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that the platoon is able to pass actionable intelligence and support requests through to the 
highest levels of the MEU staff with minimum delays. 
 
D. THE MANA COMBAT SIMULATION TOOL 
Now that the scenario has been described, this section briefly describes the 
MANA combat modeling environment, a tool for creating agent-based distillations, and 
why it was chosen.  In the next section, the implementation of the scenario in MANA will 
be covered.  Readers interested in a detailed technical description of the software should 
consult the user’s manual, which can be downloaded from the Project Albert Website at 
http://www.projectalbert.org/. 
 
1. Why MANA? 
Map Aware Non-uniform Automata, or MANA, is the modeling environment 
selected for the development of the combat simulation used in this research.  David 
Galligan and Michael Lauren began development of MANA for the New Zealand Army 
and Defense Force in 2000 after being exposed to early Project Albert agent-based 
models in 1999.  In a nutshell, the goal of MANA is to, “explore the greatest range of 
possible outcomes with the least set-up time.”(MANA Help File)  Developer contact 
information is provided on the about screen from the help menu, shown in Figure 12.  
Since its development, MANA has been one of the data farming tools in the Project 
Albert suite of tools.  It has been used in several Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) theses 
in recent years to analyze real world problems including humanitarian relief operations, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, convoy protection, and command and control (Dr. Tom Lucas 
Web Page, NPS, 2005).  It is often referred to as an agent-based distillation, since it 
provides capability to model many of the most critical combat interactions by creating 
independent entities with unique characteristics, but not with the physical precision of an 
engineering model.  MANA allows an analyst to model complex combat situations with 
terrain and communications in a relatively short amount of time.  As distillations, models 
built in the MANA environment tend to run very quickly, allowing the analyst to execute 
the model thousands or millions of times as part of a sophisticated designed experiment.  
The ability to run these large scale experiments is what enables the analyst to extract a 
large amount of information from the model.  
 
Figure 12.   MANA About screen provides contact information. (from MANA v3.0.39 
Help File) 
 
The main reasons the MANA modeling environment was chosen over other 
available options were flexibility, ease of use, and the ability to run large experiments.  
The MANA model allows the easy incorporation of terrain and elevation, 
communications, and numerous pre-programmed state changes.  In MANA, one can 
quickly build a rough skeleton of the model from a realistic scenario, and then refine 
agent parameters and state changes to create a reasonably accurate model of the combat 
interactions desired.  The flexibility of the model allows easy changes to be made to 
conduct experiments and what if analysis.  In this research, a MANA model was 
constructed iteratively from the data provided in the MCWL scenario outlined previously 
in this chapter.  Once the base case was constructed, it was easy to create numerous 




2. Characteristics of the MANA Combat Modeling Environment 
MANA is a time-step, agent-based modeling environment.  In a MANA model, the 
agents are: 
• Map Aware—Agents have situational awareness of the other agents and 
terrain that is updated by sensors and communications. 
• Non-uniform—Individual agents may have different behavior parameters, 
capabilities, sensors, weapons, and communications.   
• Automata—Agents react independently on the battlefield according to 
their own individual characteristics and awareness. 
This distillation allows for graphical depiction of the terrain and agents to the desired 
level of detail.  It is essentially a two-dimensional environment, with elevation being 
factored in when calculating line of sight and firing solutions.  MANA is a straight 
forward application that is intuitive and easy to use with a well developed Graphical User 
Interface (GUI).  The data farming techniques built in and provided by MCWL provide 
the ability to explore an extensive range of input parameter settings in minimal time.  
More details are readily available in the MANA User’s Manual and at the Project Albert 
Website listed at the beginning of this section. 
 
E. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SIMULATION MODEL 
This section describes in layman’s terms the basic characteristics of the MANA 
simulation model developed for this thesis.  It starts with a description of the goal of the 
simulation, followed by an overview of the model at a conceptual level.  Following the 
conceptual description are detailed descriptions of the scale and terrain model, the enemy 
force, the Marine platoon, and the logistical support schemes which are the focus of the 
analysis.  Throughout this research, the enemy insurgent force is often referred to as the 
red force, while the friendly Marine platoon is referred to as the blue force.  A detailed 





The simulation models the scenario described in this chapter as a long term 
mission (7-14 days) with the goal of measuring the effectiveness of different logistical 
support systems on the effectiveness of the DO platoon in its mission to stop the 
insurgents.  The measure of effectiveness is the number of insurgents that are 
successfully interdicted.  Factors of interest include but are not limited to: blue force days 
of supply, routine resupply rate, resupply signature, usage rates in various combat states, 
rapid request setup time, and resupply policy.  The data farming techniques used by 
Project Albert allow the exploration of these and many other factors to determine 
effective support paradigms and significant factors. 
 
2. Conceptual Model 
In Figure 13, the overall concept of the simulation model is represented as an 
inventory queuing model. In a basic queuing model, there are customers who arrive for 
service, servers who provide the service, an inventory available to the servers, and a 
warehouse where additional inventory is stored.  In this model, the customers are the 
enemy insurgents.  The service they require is interdiction by Marines (to put it bluntly, 
they need to be killed).  The Marine platoon provides the service using its combat 
capabilities to destroy the insurgents.  If the Marine platoon’s inventory of logistical 
supplies and combat power becomes depleted, it becomes more likely that the enemy will 
not be interdicted.  The platoon’s inventory of supplies can be refilled by several different 
methods, in much the same way that a store must reorder inventory from a central 
warehouse.  Depending on the strength of the enemy and the effectiveness of the 
logistical support plan, more or less enemy will be successfully served.  An effective 
service is a killed enemy insurgent; therefore, the measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the 
number of enemy killed divided by the total end strength of the enemy force.  In other 
words, the effectiveness of the scheme of logistical support is measured by how well the 
platoon is able to prevent the enemy soldiers from crossing the border.  While 
conceptually this model is fairly straightforward, the interactions between the customers, 
servers, and resupply agents is based on combat interactions, including command and 
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Figure 13.   This figure shows the logical flow of the combat simulation used in this 
study. 
 
3. Terrain and Scale 
Since MANA is a time step model, there must be a mapping from real time to 
simulation time, and real space to the simulation space.  In the implementation of this 
scenario, one model time step is equal to thirty seconds of real time.  For a seven day 
scenario this equates to 20,160 model time steps.  In order to minimize the potential 
inaccuracies of using a time step model, the scale of the terrain was chosen to be thirty 
meters per map cell.  The map consists of a 200 by 200 grid of cells which translates into 
the six kilometer by six kilometer area alluded to in the scenario description.  This scale 
level limits the likelihood of time step anomalies which can be caused when agents can 
move more than one cell in a time step.  Under these scaling factors, a seven day scenario 
takes between two and ten minutes per execution and a fourteen day scenario averages 
about forty minutes of run time.  The major reason for the variability of the run times is 
that time step model run time increases as a function of the number of entities squared. 
The terrain in the model is composed of two separate and distinct elements. The 
foundation is the elevation file shown in Figure 14.  In the elevation map, pure white 
represents the highest elevation, while pure black represents the lowest.  MANA uses the 
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elevation data to calculate whether or not a line of sight exists between two agents.  The 
elevation used in the scenario is only relative, with mountain tops defined as the highest 
elevation and roads and valley being the lowest.  The inclusion of terrain allows the red 
force to use terrain to mask its movement and prevents the blue force from simply sitting 
back and waiting on the enemy to get within range. 
 
Graphical Representation of 





Figure 14.   The Elevation and Terrain files used by MANA were derived from the 
terrain in the MCWL Scenario.  [Best viewed in color] 
 
The second element of the terrain is the terrain file, also shown in Figure 14.  The 
various colors represent roads, vegetation, and hills.  Figure 15 shows  the way the 
various terrain colors affect movement speed (going), probability of hit (cover), and 
probability of detection (conceal).  The effects are per time step.  For the light bush 
terrain, which comprises the low foot hills and roadsides in the terrain map, movement 
speed is only 75% of the maximum speed for the agent, the probability of a bullet being 
blocked by terrain is 10%, and the probability of not being seen per time step is 30%.  It 
must be remembered that these effects only matter if a line of sight exists between the 
agents.  If two agents are on either side of a tall hill, the probability that they will see 
each other is zero, regardless of the terrain. 
 
Figure 15.   The characteristics of the colors in the terrain file for the MANA model 
used in this research.  (from MANA 3.0.39) 
 
4. Red Force (Enemy Insurgents) 
Insurgents arrive in the western area of the corridor at random locations 
periodically throughout the mission.  As long as they think they are safe from blue forces 
they attempt to move quickly to their destination along known paths.  If they are engaged 
with indirect fire, they will hide (hunker down) for a period of time, provided they 
survive the volley.  When engaged with direct fire, they return fire and attempt to move 
away from friendly forces seeking cover and concealment.  If there are enough insurgents 
moving together they may try to suppress blue forces with fire while moving to their 
objective.  If red forces detect that a resupply operation is taking place, they will use the 
distraction of friendly forces to their advantage by advancing on their objective.  Enemy 
forces move as individuals or small groups.  The main goal of enemy is to reach their 




5. Blue Force (Marine DO Platoon) 
The blue force is arrayed as shown in Figure 11 as a dismounted (due to terrain) 
infantry platoon and each squad conducts patrols in the vicinity of its patrol base in order 
to maximize observation of the area.  Patrols are necessary due to the obscuration effects 
of the terrain.  Blue force sensors, weapons, and communications are sufficient to provide 
mutual support with fires and intelligence, but their dispersion is too great for internal 
redistribution of supplies.  Indirect fire is modeled as the MEU’s artillery battery, but 
could be considered any type of joint or coalition fires whether land or air based.  If MEU 
artillery was the only available fire support, a DO platoon would have very limited range, 
but the current concept is predicated on accessing joint and aviation fire support, so the 
limiting factor of artillery range is not considered in this analysis.  Blue squads begin 
their mission with a specified number of days of supply and use them at different rates 
depending on their state.  When blue squads are conducting surveillance or patrolling 
operations they use supplies at a rate of one day of supply per day.  When engaged in 
combat operations they use supplies more quickly.  When a blue fire team runs out of 
supplies they become combat ineffective and retreat to the patrol base to await resupply.  
Casualties are modeled as a fire team running out of supplies as well, since one casualty 
would take at least one fire team out of operation to evacuate that Marine.  When out of 
supplies or while distributing supplies, it is much easier for red forces to maneuver past 
blue positions. 
 
6. Logistical Support 
Logistical support is modeled as a fuel tank for each blue fire team and 
headquarters element.  When the tank is empty, the team is not effective at coordinating 
fire support or engaging terrorists.  Each squad has a resupply point at which it receives 
deliveries and conducts evacuations.  Supply operations are scheduled, but can be 
triggered by rapid requests or by sense and respond (autonomic) logistics.  Since medical 
evacuation or resupply represent a significant effort by support agencies, it is assumed 
that any rapid request mission or medical evacuation will bring the platoon a full set of 
supplies depending on how much they can carry.  For instance, if the platoon goes in with 
one day of supply, it is assumed that it is all it can carry. 
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7. Data Sources, Abstractions, Assumptions, and Validation 
In a combat model, the source of the data is a matter of some concern.  For this 
model, several abstractions have been made that reduce these requirements somewhat.  
Radio communication and common operational picture equipment is assumed to function 
perfectly throughout the AOR.  DO platoon sensor and radio capabilities are available on 
MCWL’s website and in the reports that have been cited.   
Weapons ranges and firing rates are available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org> 
and <www.fas.org> and are assumed to have a probability of hit of near one at close 
range.  The probability of hit reduces linearly to 0.5 at max effective range.  This 
modeling technique was obtained from a tool developed by Captain Mike Babilot, USMC 
at NPS, who consolidated the ranges and effectiveness of all DO weapons.  Since this 
model uses a single agent to model a fire team, it has the hit probability of an M-16, out 
to max effective range, and then hit probability degrades to 0.1 at the max effective range 
of the M-249.  Enemy weapons have the same range as friendly weapons, but blue 
casualties are modeled as a depletion of supplies instead of as a loss of available hit 
points since the model does not allow for the resurrection of dead or wounded agents.  
Red force agents die when their available hit points run out.  .  As a result, the sensitivity 
of direct fire weapon effectiveness will be explored indirectly in the simulation 
experiment by varying the red agents’ hit points.   
Artillery characteristics and ground tactics were validated with Colonel Ed 
Lesnowicz, a retired Marine artillery officer with Wisdom Jacket Consulting, who 
consulted on this research.  The scheme of maneuver and scheme of support for the 
scenario were derived from the MCWL scenario, but were not directly specified.  They 
were derived by a mission analysis process and the application of professional skill that 
the author has gained as a logistician and Marine officer coupled with recommendations 
in the MCWL wargame report.  Simulation parameters that can not be established solidly 
from data or to which the outcome is sensitive are explored by the experimental design 
described in Chapter III.  After the model development was complete, it was reviewed by 
a panel of Marines and scientists familiar with this type of research.  A skeptical reader 
must keep in mind that this simulation model will not be used to predict success or failure 
for a particular mission.  This model is used to more fully understand the problems 
associated with sustaining a DO platoon in order to develop a logistical support concept 
that will be based on the actual requirements of the Marines while also accounting for the 
increased risk associated with DO.  Appendix B contains a detailed breakdown of all the 
simulation parameter settings.  Figure 16 shows a screen shot of the working simulation 
model. 
 
Figure 16.   This shows two different views of the simulation running.  On the left is 
artillery firing with the terrain map displayed.  On the right is a resupply 
with the scenario background. [Best viewed in color] 
 
The best illustration of the quality, credibility, and utility of the model developed 
for this research, other than the data analysis in Chapter IV, is the level of team work that 
went into its production.  The simulation model development process occurred between 
January and April 2005.  During this time frame, the model development process was 
evaluated weekly by other military officers, combat and simulation modeling experts, and 
international military officers.  The model development process even included a trip to 
the Maui High Performance Computing Center (MHPCC) to work directly with experts 
in agent-based simulation modeling.  Each parameter of the final model was scrutinized 
in detail by a panel which included Dr. Tom Lucas, PhD, a combat modeling expert at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, Ed Lesnowicz, a Marine artillery colonel with experience in 
Vietnam at Khe Sanh and as Chief of Staff for Marine Forces Europe, Todd Sanders, an 
infantry captain and operations research analyst with experience in widely dispersed 
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small unit tactics on rough terrain, and Kevin McMindes, a Marine major helicopter pilot 
and operations research analyst with assault support experience.  The model was 
debugged by varying parameters simultaneously throughout their ranges in order to 
ensure the model behavior was correct across the ranges of interest.  Additionally, before 
any research quality data was generated from the model, the entire model development 
process was briefed to the director of MCWL’s Project Albert, Dr. Gary Horne, PhD.  
 
8. Summary 
To put it all together, this thesis uses the MANA simulation tool to model a 
realistic combat scenario that might be faced by a Marine DO platoon.  This particular 
scenario was chosen because it is logistically challenging and based on a scenario used 
during MCWL’s DO wargame.  The resulting model captures the essential critical 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis makes use of a MCWL Project Albert technique called Data Farming, 
which was developed in large part by the director of the project, Dr. Gary Horne, in 1998.  
Put as succinctly as possible, Data Farming involves taking a relatively simple simulation 
model, like the one used in this thesis, and running it many times while simultaneously 
changing many of the input parameters.  The resulting data set allows an analyst to 
explore the landscape of possible outcomes in order to more fully understand a problem.  
The goal is not prediction.  According to Dr. Horne, “You can’t really predict anything, 
but if you look at enough possibilities, you can begin to understand.”(Lawlor, 2005)  It 
would be nice if one could look at all possibilities, but, “You can never cover the 
landscape because you’re up against virtual infinity.”(ibid)  Since it is not possible to 
look at everything, even with access to the Maui High Performance Computing Center 
(MHPCC), it was necessary to design experiments that explore the possible outputs of the 
simulation in a smart way, recognizing that an analyst cannot look at everything he would 
like. 
This chapter starts by outlining the parameters chosen as variables for the 
simulation experiment in this thesis.  Since model refinement and exploration required 
several experiments, the next topic covered is the debugging experiment which was used 
to debug the model and narrow the focus of the study.  Finally, this chapter describes the 
final experimental designs used to generate the data used to more fully understand the 
challenges associated with supporting a DO platoon. 
 
B. VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
This section describes the simulation parameters, or factors, that were chosen for 
the experiment.  Controllable factors are those factors that a decision maker can control 
in the real world, and are often called decision factors.  The uncontrollable factors are 
those that cannot be controlled in the real world by a decision maker, such as enemy 
capabilities.  Since they cannot be controlled in the real world yet contribute to the 
overall variability, they are often called noise factors.  Since there are many abstractions 
in the simulation, it would be possible to consider certain factors as both decision and 
noise factors.  For example, the speed of the logistics delivery agency can represent 
vehicle speed, which is controllable, or it can represent the affect of weather on a fixed 
doctrinal speed, which is uncontrollable.  Since these distinctions can tend to become 
murky, especially a priori, this research considers decision factors as those that are more 
or less controllable by the Marines, and the noise factors are those that are more or less 
controllable by the enemy.  Since some variables of interest are categorical as defined by 
various logistical support systems, this section concludes with a description of several 
scenarios that were created as slight variations of the basic scenario described in Chapter 
II.  Figure 17 summarizes the variable simulation parameters, and their maximum ranges 
used in the experimental designs. 
Figure 17.   The variable factors in the experimental design.  Decision factors are in 
yellow, and noise factors are in white.  Value ranges are for the Debugging 
design.  [Best viewed in color] 
 
Factor Value Range Explanation 
DO Platoon Days of Supply 1..5 The amount of supplies, in days, carried into initial deployment 
Scheduled Resupply Days 1..5 The number of days between scheduled resupply missions 
Consumption rate when in   
enemy contact (fuel/step) 1..100 
Consumption rate of blue squads when in contact with the 
enemy 
Consumption rate when shot at 
(fuel / step) 1..100 
Consumption rate of blue squads when in direct contact (i.e. 
in a fire fight with the enemy) 
Rapid request setup time (min) 1..360 Time, in minutes, from time of request to time of resupply unit departure from combat service support area 
Time to conduct resupply (min) 1..60 Time, in minutes, to execute the transfer of supplies and casualties when the resupply unit arrives at DO platoon 
Resupply speed (m/s) 50..1000 Movement speed, in meters per second, of the Resupply force
Resupply stealth (rate per time 
step) 0..100 Concealment rate  of resupply force per time step 
Resupply sensor range 34..167 Sensor detection and classification range, in meters, of resupply force 
Inorganic sensor persistence 
friendly (min) 1..120 
Time, in minutes, a blue force sensor will maintain a 
previously reported track of an enemy agent 
Sense and respond lead time 
(hrs) 0..12 
The amount of lead time built into the sense and respond 
(autonomic logistics) system in hours 
Enemy Sensor Range (m) 90..2040 Sensor range, in meters, of the enemy’s sensors 
Enemy Squad Size 1..20 Number of agents in an enemy squad 
Contact Persistence Enemy 
(min) 1..120 
Time, in minutes, enemy forces will continually track a blue 
agent 




1. Controllable Factors 
The following factors were chosen to explore the effectiveness of the DO platoon 
under various logistical systems: 
a. DO Platoon Days of Supply 
This is defined as the number of days of supply the DO platoon carries 
into the AOR. 
b. Scheduled Resupply Days 
This is the number of days between scheduled resupply missions. 
c. Consumption Rate When in Enemy Contact (fuel/thirty seconds) 
This is the defined as the usage rate of supplies by the DO platoon while 
maneuvering against or engaging the enemy. 
d. Consumption Rate When Shot At (fuel/thirty seconds) 
This is defined as the usage rate of supplies by the DO platoon while being 
fired upon by the enemy.  This is a creative use of limited features in the simulation tool 
to capture unanticipated logistics events such as casualties and equipment failure.  
e. Rapid Request Setup Time (minutes) 
This is the time lag between receipt of an emergency request (at least one 
fire team of the DO platoon is out of action) until the resupply mission is launched.  It 
represents the difficulty in responding to urgent requests by assets that may not be 
dedicated or properly configured. 
f. Time to Conduct Resupply (minutes) 
This is the amount of time the individual elements of the platoon are out of 
action while receiving supplies from the supporting agency.  While a fire team is 
downloading supplies, it is not very effective at conducting its interdiction mission. 
g. Resupply Speed (meters/second) 
This is the movement speed of the agents that conduct the resupply 
missions.  It can represent either the speed with which the resupply assets are capable of 
moving to the delivery point or the distance they must travel.  It could also be interpreted 
as the delay caused by operating in poor weather conditions.  
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h. Resupply Stealth (percentage) 
This is the concealment rate, per time step, of the resupply agents.  The 
enemy agents try to take advantage of the resupply mission by moving more quickly 
while the DO platoon is out of action downloading supplies.  If the resupply agents are 
undetected, this enemy tactic is negated. 
i. Resupply Sensor Range (meters) 
This is the range of sensors on board the resupply agents which are 
modeled as aircraft.  The sensors can be used to pass intelligence on enemy activities 
while conducting a resupply mission.  The DO platoon can use intelligence from the 
resupply agents to coordinate indirect fires on the enemy. 
j. Inorganic Sensor Persistence Friendly (minutes) 
This is the amount of time tracks are maintained on the blue force 
situational awareness map.  This is used to provide some sensitivity analysis on the value 
and effect of information.  If tracks are maintained long after the enemy is out of the area, 
the DO platoon could potentially waste resources or fire support assets in a vain attempt 
to seek out and destroy the enemy.   
k. Sense and Respond Lead Time (hours) 
This is the amount of lead time that the autonomic logistics system uses to 
conduct push logistics.  The sense and respond system tracks the DO platoon usage rate 
when in and out of enemy contact exactly, but it cannot track or anticipate the usage rates 
generated by enemy fire.  Essentially, it cannot predict casualties.  Based on its tracking 
of supply levels, it can trigger a resupply mission before it expects the DO platoon to run 
out of supplies.  
 
2. Uncontrollable Factors 
These are the noise factors, used to ensure that any conclusions drawn are based 
on a broad exploration of enemy threat levels.  They are listed below: 
a. Enemy Sensor Range (meters) 
This is the detection and classification range, in meters, of the enemy’s 
sensors.  Since the enemy is trying to infiltrate and avoid blue forces, having a longer 
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sensor range is an advantage.  Conversely, with a shorter sensor range, the enemy is 
placed at a disadvantage. 
b. Enemy Squad Size 
This is the number of enemy agents in each squad of enemy.  There are 
forty enemy squads in the seven day scenario.  Varying this parameter directly changes 
the level of combat intensity. 
c. Enemy Contact Persistence (minutes) 
Defined as the time, in minutes, enemy forces will keep a blue contact on 
their situational awareness map.  This parameter is used for sensitivity analysis. 
d. Enemy Hits to Kill 
This is the number of times an enemy agent has to be hit by direct or 
indirect fire to be killed.  It is a way to vary the intensity of combat.  A low value could 
also represent very effective blue weapons while a high value could represent less 
effective weapons.  
 
3. Scenarios 
The basic scenario is described in great detail in Chapter II, but, for the purposes 
of the simulation experiment, four additional scenarios were created as simple 
modifications.  These scenarios are useful for identifying the key characteristics of an 
effective logistics system.  The scenarios are as follows: 
a. Full Model 
This model is as described in Chapter II.  In this model, there are 
scheduled resupply missions, rapid requests, and autonomic logistics.  Additionally, the 
resupply agents can deliver battlefield intelligence gained from their sensors. 
b. No Resupply Intelligence Model 
This is identical to the Full model, except that the resupply agents, which 
are modeled like helicopters, cannot provide intelligence information on enemy 
movements to the DO platoon.  This is to measure the utility of resupply assets doubling 
as intelligence platforms.  This scenario is referred to as the “NoHelo” model during the 
data analysis. 
36 
c. No Rapid Request Model 
This is identical to the Full Model except that the DO platoon is unable to 
request support via rapid request.  Under this circumstance, a fire team could remain out 
of commission due to a maintenance or medical issue until the next scheduled supply or 
until the sense and respond system triggers a resupply mission.  One would not 
deliberately send Marines into combat without the ability to conduct rapid requests, but 
this model helps to measure the utility of rapid requests by comparison.  This scenario is 
referred to as the “NoRR” model during the analysis. 
d. No Sense and Respond Model 
This is identical to the Full Model except that the autonomic logistics 
capability is removed.  This scenario is referred to as the “NoSR” model during the 
analysis. 
e. Scheduled Resupply Only Model 
This is identical to the Full Model but both rapid requests and sense and 
respond logistics are removed.  Only scheduled resupply missions are allowed.  Once 
again this helps measure the utility of rapid requests and autonomic logistics.  
Each of these scenarios can be run as either a seven or fourteen day 
mission.  In the next sections, the way in which these scenarios and parameters are put 
together to form an experiment is described in detail.  This scenario is referred to as the 
“SchedOnly” model during the analysis. 
 
C. THE EXPERIMENT 
Developing a simulation experiment is an iterative process in which 
experimentation and data analysis is done in order to debug the model, verify behaviors, 
and narrow the focus of the final experiment.  The experiment done is this thesis was 
done in three stages.  The first stage was a debugging experiment.  The second stage was 
a fairly large exploration across all the parameters.  The final stage was a much more 
focused exploration and very large in scale.  This section begins by describing a critical 
tool in the experimental design, the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH).  It then 
describes the experiments designed for each of the three stages of experimental 
37 
development.  Detailed tables of the actual experimental designs are contained in 
Appendix C.  
 
1. The Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube 
The NOLH space filling experimental design technique used in this research was 
developed by LtCol Thomas Cioppa, U.S. Army, at NPS in 2002.  This technique allows 
for the exploration of a large number of input parameters in an efficient number of runs 
while maintaining nearly orthogonal design columns. (Cioppa, 2002)  For example, using 
just high and low levels for each of the variables listed in Figure 17 would result in 215, or 
32,768 combinations of input parameters.  The NOLH allows the exploration of the same 
space with sixty-five combinations of input parameters, and does not limit one to using 
only high and low values.  Nearly orthogonal design columns are essentially 
uncorrelated, which gives the resulting data nice statistical properties.  Since this 
technique is merely the tool that helps make this research possible, and not a subject of 
the research itself, the algorithms are not covered here.  The reader is cautioned that one 
never gets something for nothing and that a NOLH design, while efficient, is not 
complete.  For this reason, this research uses a combination of experimental design 
techniques combining factorial designs with the NOLH designs.  This technique provides 
more data in critical regions and ensures fair comparisons between various input levels. 
 
2. Debugging Design 
The debugging design was simple to create using the NOLH generating 
spreadsheet tool, created by Dr. Susan Sanchez, a Professor of Operations Research at 
NPS, and used in the Advanced Simulation course. (Sanchez, 2005)  The experimental 
design consisted of taking all of the factors listed in Figure 17 and the ranges listed, 
except for sense and respond lead time, and inputting them into the tool.  Since this 
experiment had fourteen variables, the NOLH tool generated sixty-five excursions.  An 
excursion is a unique combination of input parameters.  The experiment was designed to 
run each of the sixty-five excursions twenty times each.  Each repetition of an excursion 
is called a replication.  This experiment called for a total of 1,300 replications and was 
only run for the Full Model as a seven day mission.  The resulting data was not usable for 
the research, but it was useful in tracking down several bugs in the model.  After 
corrections and further tests were made, the model was ready for producing analysis 
quality data. 
Figure 18 shows a scatter plot matrix of the debugging design. The factor names 
are on the diagonal.  Each of the plots shows all the input combinations of the factors in 
its column and row.  Notice the excellent space filling properties.  The maximum 
correlation coefficient between any two factors is 0.079.  This helps to ensure that factor 
effects will not be confounded with other factors. 
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Figure 18.   A scatter plot matrix of the debugging design. 
 
3. Exploration Design 
The exploratory design was devised to provide a broad brush analysis of all the 
parameters across all the scenarios.  It consists of thirty-three excursions of the decision 
factors (except sense and respond lead time) and seventeen excursions of the noise 
factors.  The Cartesian product of the decision and noise factors results in 561 excursions.  
This ensures that each decision point is compared against all seventeen excursions of 
noise.  This 561 excursion experiment was run with twenty replications per excursion for 
each of the five scenarios using a seven day mission.  This resulted in 56,100 data points.  
A quick exploration of this data revealed that more information was needed about days of 
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supply and that a parameter needed to be added to test sense and respond lead time.  This 
data also gave a fairly good understanding of the effects of the noise factors.  One of the 
decision factors, resupply sensor range, was so insignificant that it was dropped from the 
next design and replaced with sense and respond lead time.  
 
4. Large Scale Experiment 
This experiment ran from 7 June 2005 to 7 July 2005 at MHPCC, anecdotally 
setting a record for the longest simulation run submitted for an NPS thesis using Project 
Albert tools.  While there is no way to really check this, it is an illustration of the desire 
to widely explore the decision space.  The excursion values are in Appendix C.  Briefly 
summarized here, this design was developed to widely explore areas where logistical 
decisions have to be made.  All feasible scheduled resupply policies, fifteen total, were 
crossed with three levels of sense and respond lead time.  The resulting 45 excursion 
design was then crossed with 17 excursions of the seven remaining decision factors in an 
NOLH.  This resulted in 765 design points in the decision space.  This design was then 
crossed with three levels of noise which can best be characterized as low intensity, 
medium intensity, and high intensity combat.  The result, 2,295 excursions times five 
scenarios.  The full model was run with twenty replications per excursion.  The remaining 
models were run with ten replications in order to save time.  This resulted in 137,700 data 
points.   
 
D. RUNNING THE EXPERIMENT 
One of the core strengths of Project Albert is its ability to leverage 
supercomputing assets to run simulations many times.  MHPCC is where all the 
simulation experiments for this research were done.  MHPCC takes the simulation files 
along with an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) study file which specifies how the 
input parameters are to be varied.  Development of the study file is not trivial, but Project 
Albert provides both an application and a web interface for study file creation.  Study 
packages can be submitted online from anywhere in the world via the Internet or 
electronic mail.  Once the study is submitted, the personnel at MHPCC run it on the 
cluster and generate the output files.  While the simulation is running, the analyst can 
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check its progress in real time via a web interface.  The value of MHPCC is that it 
enables the analyst to run large scale, long term experiments, in an almost fire and forget 
fashion.  The experiments run for this research utilized more than 700 CPU days at 
MHPCC.  In other words, a normal desktop computer would have to run for nearly two 
years non-stop to generate all the data used in this research.  MHPCC was able to do it in 
about a month and a half.  Had NOLH techniques not been used in this research, the 
simulations could have taken over 2,000 CPU years to explore the same decision space.  
In the next chapter, the 193,800 data points generated from the experiments are analyzed 
to draw conclusions about the best way to sustain the DO platoon and to begin to answer 
the questions posed by this research.  More information about the study submission 
process at MHPCC can be obtained at <http://www.projectalbert.org>. (Project Albert 
Website, July 2005) 
41 
IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
The experimental designs described in the previous chapter combined with the 
computing power of the data farming environment at the Maui High Performance 
Computing Center (MHPCC) allows a great deal of information to be extracted from the 
simulation model.  In this chapter, the data collection and post processing is briefly 
described, followed by a more detailed analysis of the data.  In order to gain the most 
information possible in a short time, this analysis focuses on answering the research 
questions presented in Chapter I.  Following this, additional analytical insights are 
presented.  Throughout this analysis, it is useful to keep in mind a quote by the late 
mathematician and NPS professor of computer science, Richard Hamming.  He once 
said, “The purpose of computing is insight, not numbers.”  In this chapter, the focus will 
be gaining insights into supporting a distributed operations (DO) platoon. 
 
A. DATA COLLECTION AND POST PROCESSING 
Using the Project Albert data farming environment hosted at MHPCC makes data 
collection and post processing a simple process.  When an experiment is complete, the 
MHPCC cluster generates a comma-separated values (CSV) text file containing all the 
input variables from the experimental design along with the desired measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs).  The raw CSV file contains the input and output data in the terms 
of the simulation parameters.  Post processing consists mainly of converting simulation 
units into sensible measurements like days of supply (DOS), hours, minutes, et cetera.  
The MOE, proportion of enemy killed, is calculated by simply adding up the total number 
of enemy killed and dividing by the total number of enemy.  The MOE is bounded 
between zero and one and bigger is better.  It is often presented as a percentage for 
readability.  The MOE is approximately normally distributed by construction since it is 
calculated from the sum of a large number of random variables.  This is because each 
enemy squad that attempts to cross the border has a random number of fatalities. The 
sample size for each run is at least forty enemy squads.  The general conditions set forth 
by the Central Limit Theorem for approximate normality seem to be met. (Conover, 
1999) In order to measure the variability of these proportion estimates and to get a good 
estimate of the mean performance, the experiment is replicated at least ten times at each 
excursion.  A series of goodness of fit tests for the normal distribution (Shapiro-Wilk W- 
test) on randomly selected excursions do not provide any evidence against the claim of 
normality.  An example is shown below.  As a result, this data is robust for analysis using 
a wide variety of statistical techniques, including regression.  JMP Statistical Discovery 
Software version 5.1.2 was used as the primary tool for data post processing and analysis.  
 
Figure 19.   One of a series of random goodness of fit tests on the MOE for an 
excursion.  The large p-value (Prob<W) indicates that there is no statistical 
evidence against normality. 
 
B. INSIGHTS INTO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Recall from Chapter I that this research set out to answer three specific questions 
about supporting a DO platoon.  The first two can be directly addressed through data 
analysis, while the third will have to wait until the next chapter.  These questions are 
reproduced below: 
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• What are the critical logistical factors relating to mission success for the 
DO platoon in the missions envisioned in MCWL’s Wargame Scenarios? 
• What are the critical logistical capabilities of the MEU that will enable it 
to provide continuous sustainment to a distributed force? 
• What is the supportability of a DO platoon across the range of missions? 
 
1. Critical factors 
This section identifies the critical logistical factors by doing a top down analysis 
of the simulation data.  It starts with a data summary and works its way down into the 
details of the critical factors.  
a. Data Summary 
To begin identifying critical factors, it is best to first look at a summarization of 
the entire data set and then drill down into specific factors.  The distribution of all the 
seven day scenario data (both the Exploration and Large Scale experiments) is shown in 
Figure 20.  A 95% confidence interval for the mean proportion killed is (0.582, 0.590).    
 
Figure 20.   The distribution of the MOE and the standard deviation of the MOE for all 
the 7 day scenario data. 
 
b. Scenarios 
When the data is divided into the five qualitative scenarios, the first 
insights are revealed.  In Figure 21, one can clearly see that the Full scenario has the most 
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favorable distribution of the MOE.  The Scheduled Resupply Only (SchedOnly) scenario 
has the worst.  Removing observers from the helicopters (NoHelo) causes a significant 
reduction in effectiveness.  Adding sense and respond to the SchedOnly model creates the 
No Rapid Request Model (NoRR), which is clearly better than SchedOnly.  Translating 
the statistical insights into logistical ones clearly shows that the best logistical support 
system includes a rapid request system, a sense and respond system, and airborne 
intelligence assets.  This means that a good balance between push and pull logistics 
combined with intelligence and fire support will contribute to the most effective DO 
platoon.  Logistically, it is clear that given the uncertainties of combat demands, a strong 
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Figure 21.   The distribution of seven day mission data for each of the five scenarios.  
The Full model scenario has the best overall performance. 
 
c. Quantitative factors 
In this section, all of the quantitative factors are looked at, followed by a 
detailed look at the logistical factors in order to support the development of the estimate 
in the next chapter.  In Figure 22, the percent of the variability of the data explained by 
each of the quantitative factors alone is shown.  These values were calculated by fitting a 
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single factor regression model against the MOE.  Knowing which factors have the most 
explanatory power helps guide further analysis.  The four most significant logistical 
factors are resupply speed, the DO platoon supply usage rate while in contact, the 
maximum DOS on hand, and the rapid request setup time.  These factors are consistent 
between the two experiments.  Enemy factors clearly dominate the first experiment and 
so the only enemy parameter varied in the second experiment is the enemy squad size.  
From the importance of the noise factors and of the use rate while in contact, it is clear 
that the intensity of the combat is a critical indicator of how successful the DO platoon 
will be.  
 
Figure 22.   Shows the variability explained by each quantitative factor alone (no 
interactions accounted for).  Clearly, resupply speed has the most 
explanatory power of all logistical factors. 
 
One thing to keep in mind at this point is that these factors are across all 
scenarios.  For example, rapid request setup time is not going to explain much in 
situations without rapid request.  Figure 22 provides some rough guidance on significant 
factors if one is unaware of what combination of rapid request, intelligence, and sense 
and respond will be used for a particular mission.  Since it t the full scenario provides the 
best performance, it is analyzed independently. 
Figure 23 shows the same single factor coefficients of determination (R2) 
for the Full scenario.  The same four logistical factors are the most explanatory, but for 
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the Full model, rapid request setup time explains more of the variance independently than 
does resupply speed.  The two most explanatory variables are tied to responsiveness, 
which, according to Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 4-1, is the 
“keystone” of effective logistical support. (MCWP 4-1, 1999) 
Single factor R2 for all Full Model data
Resupply conduct time (min)
Resupply Stealth
CSR (days)
Friendly IO Contact Persist (min)
EN Org Contact Persist (min)
SR Lead(hrs)
Enemy Sensor Range (m)
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Figure 23.   The single factor coefficients of determination for the Full scenario model. 
 
d. Full Scenario Regression Model 
In order to identify the effects of the important factors already discovered, 
a multiple regression model is fit to the data for the Full scenario.  Before fitting the 
regression model, the data was averaged across the replications to generate a mean value 
of the MOE for each excursion.  This resulted in 2570 data points (reduced from 51,400) 
with no loss of information for computing the regression coefficients.  The JMP statistical 
software allows the user to execute a stepwise regression, which is a heuristic for finding 
a good linear mathematical model that fits the data.  Any regression model must balance 
simplicity with explanatory power, so this analysis will only consider polynomial and 
interaction terms to the second degree.  The data collected has a high level of variability 
for proportions of enemy killed that are near 50% and low variability for proportions near 
10% and 90%.  Since this condition seemed to manifest itself as a heavy tailed residual 
distribution no matter which type of regression or transformation was used, this research 
uses basic least squares linear regression, since its results are the easiest to explain.  With 
heavy tailed residuals, the confidence intervals generated from the regression model 
(which are not a subject of this research) will not have the exact theoretical confidence 
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levels, but the parameter estimates are still unbiased since the response variable is 
normally distributed. 
When fitting a regression model, especially from data with numerous 
predictor variables and interactions, it is important to balance the explanatory power of 
the model with simplicity.  Figure 24 shows how adding more terms in a step-wise 
regression with all the 2nd order power and interaction terms has diminishing 
improvement in explanatory power as more terms are added.  As a result, this analysis 
limits the number of terms in the regression model to those absolutely necessary to 
understand what is happening in the simulation.  After an iterative process of examining 
various models and their strengths and weaknesses, the model shown in Figure 25 was 
chosen.  Ten percent of the data set was withheld at random from the model calculations 
in order to form a test data set.  The regression model predicted the observed values in the 
test data set very well, providing evidence that the model was not over fit.  
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Figure 24.   Shows the diminishing returns of making the regression model more 
complex. 
 
Without interpretation, a linear regression model is just a bunch of 
numbers.  In summary, the model fit for this research, shown in Figure 25, explains 87% 
of the variability in the 2570 observations with an equation that contains 24 terms.  Each 
parameter in the model is statistically significant at the 5% level.  The model also 
explains 87% of the variability in the test data set, which indicates that this model 
predicts the results of the simulation well within the data ranges in the experiment.  The 
usefulness of this model is its ability to show the relationship between the important 
factors and the MOE.  The next series of charts will use the regression model to display 
these relationships graphically. 
 




Root Mean Square Error 6.10





Model Degrees of Freedom 23.00
Error Degrees of Freedom 2546.00
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t|
1 Intercept 110.7376 1.2565 88.1337 0.0000
2 SR Lead(hrs) 0.0574 0.0267 2.1476 0.0318
3 Resupply conduct time (min) 0.0159 0.0067 2.3668 0.0180
4 Resupply Stealth 0.0079 0.0040 2.0019 0.0454
5 Resupply Speed (kph) 0.0551 0.0012 47.6094 0.0000
6 Resupply Sensor Range (m) 0.0007 0.0002 3.5589 0.0004
7 Rapid Request Setup time (hrs) -3.5482 0.0658 -53.9463 0.0000
8 Friendly IO Contact Persist (min) -0.0322 0.0067 -4.8484 0.0000
9 Enemy Squad Size -1.7595 0.0295 -59.6471 0.0000
10 Enemy Sensor Range (m) -0.0050 0.0004 -13.4704 0.0000
11 EN Hits to kill -7.8307 0.2012 -38.9161 0.0000
12 DOS(days) 2.4645 0.1071 23.0077 0.0000
13 DO use rate shot at -0.1582 0.0080 -19.7502 0.0000
14 DO use rate contact -0.3653 0.0080 -45.3892 0.0000
15 (Resupply Speed (kph)-187.922)*(Resupply Speed (kph)-187.922) 0.0003 0.0000 18.6513 0.0000
16 (Rapid Request Setup time (hrs)-3.00354)*(Resupply Speed (kph)-187.922) 0.0260 0.0008 30.9594 0.0000
17 (Rapid Request Setup time (hrs)-3.00354)*(Rapid Request Setup time (hrs)-3.00354) -0.3726 0.0544 -6.8467 0.0000
18 (DOS(days)-3.54669)*(Resupply Speed (kph)-187.922) -0.0110 0.0009 -11.6990 0.0000
19 (DOS(days)-3.54669)*(Rapid Request Setup time (hrs)-3.00354) 0.8123 0.0529 15.3573 0.0000
20 (DOS(days)-3.54669)*(DOS(days)-3.54669) -0.7373 0.0797 -9.2481 0.0000
21 (DOS(days)-3.54669)*(DO use rate contact-25.5311) 0.0593 0.0067 8.8302 0.0000
22 (DO use rate contact-25.5311)*(Resupply Speed (kph)-187.922) 0.0016 0.0001 15.2163 0.0000
23 (DO use rate contact-25.5311)*(Rapid Request Setup time (hrs)-3.00354) -0.0915 0.0062 -14.6540 0.0000
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Figure 25.   This is the regression model on the Full Scenario data with data from both 
experiments combined.  Notice how closely the predictions follow the 
actual data in the plot in the upper left. 
 
Figure 26 shows the two most explanatory logistical factors, rapid request 
setup time and resupply speed.  Both charts show that better performance in the logistical 
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factor corresponds to better performance in the MOE with generally less volatility.  
Figure 27 shows the same plots for both DOS and usage rate in enemy contact. 
One thing to keep in mind about the nature of these plots is that a large 
amount of the variability in the prediction formula in the plots is due to the nature of the 
experimental design.  Although the model generally predicts the simulation output well, 
there is quite a lot of volatility in a one way slice of the data due to the way parameters 
are varied in the Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercube (NOLH).  For example, resupply 
speed was varied simultaneously with other factors in an exploratory fashion so not all 
possible combinations were observed.  It is possible that spike in the MOE in a region 
where the MOE is in a downtrend is due to another parameter that was varied 
simultaneously.  Since humans are limited to visualizing in only two or three dimensions, 
trend lines in the plots were computed holding all other factors constant at their median 
values to illustrate the effect of the parameter alone.  A major goal of the experimental 
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Figure 26.   This figure shows the trends in the MOE for the two most explanatory 
logistical factors:  rapid request setup time and resupply speed.  [Best 
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Figure 27.   This figure shows the predicted trends in the MOE for DOS and usage rate 
in enemy contact.  [Best viewed in color] 
 
Figure 28 shows interaction plots of all the interacting parameters included 
the regression model.  To maintain model simplicity, only interactions between the four 
main logistical factors were entered into the model.  The captions are self explanatory; 
however, several points will be emphasized.  The plot itself shows the four terms in the 
model that have interactions.  An interaction means that the change in the MOE caused 
by varying one parameter is dependent upon another parameter.  The trellis plot 
containing the interactions shows the high and low levels of the factor on the row and the 
trend in the MOE by changing the factor in the column.  The diagonal is a mirror where 
the axes are reversed.  For example, the bottom left and upper right plots show the 
interaction between DOS and resupply speed.  In the upper right version, the high and 
low values of DOS are each shown with the trend in the MOE as Resupply Speed 
changes.  In the lower left version, the high and low values of Resupply Speed are shown 
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Figure 28.   Interaction plots of the four most significant logistical factors. 
Each cell of the plot shows how the MOE changes (left axis) across the range of 
one factor (label on diagonal is for the columns, levels on bottom) for two levels of an 
interacting factor (right axis) with the low and high values listed inside the cell. 
 
Notice in the bottom right hand corner of Figure 28 that the interaction 
between rapid request setup time and resupply speed is the most dramatic.  Interpreting 
this into real world terms, this means that a system that is inherently slow to react to 
demands can make up for it by being either very close to the customer or having very fast 
delivery vehicles.  Conversely, a quick reacting system can afford to have a less efficient 
delivery system or to be further from the battlefield.  For example, in bad weather, 
delivery speed may be reduced.  This could be mitigated by having resupply aircraft and 
logistics packages on standby to reduce response time.  Additionally, the plots provide 
evidence that responsiveness is more important when combat usage rates are higher and 
that DOS is less important with a responsive system.  While these results are in many 
ways intuitive, they lend credibility to the model and provide support to the decision 
making this simulation is used to support. 
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e. Summary 
In summary, this section identified the most critical logistical factors 
pertaining to supporting a DO platoon in the Full scenario, which was the best 
performing scenario overall.  Since this scenario represents a challenging long term 
mission, these factors should be incorporated into the planning of logistical support for 
any DO mission.  Recommendations on how best to support the DO platoon from the 
MEU are in the next chapter.  To conclude this section on critical factors, all of the 
experimental factors are listed below in Figure 29 with comments on their effect on the 
MOE in the Full scenario.  Figure 30 shows graphically the trends in the MOE for the 
various input factors in the regression model. 
Decsion Factors
Term Interpretation
1 Rapid Request Setup time (hrs)* Decreasing Rapid Request Setup Time improves MOE
2 Resupply Speed (kph)* Increasing Speed improves MOE
3 DO use rate contact* Decreasing Usage Rate improves MOE
4 DOS(days)* Adding DOS (how many DOS the platoon can carry) improves MOE
5 DO use rate shot at Decreasing the casualty rate improves the MOE
6 Friendly IO Contact Persist (min) Has marginal effect on MOE in this scenario
7 Resupply Sensor Range (m) Has marginal effect on MOE in this scenario
8 Resupply conduct time (min) Has marginal effect on MOE in this scenario
9 SR Lead(hrs) Has marginal effect on MOE in this scenario
10 Resupply Stealth Has marginal effect on MOE in this scenario
11 Controlled Supply Rate (CSR) (days) Has marginal effect on MOE in this scenario
Noise Factors
Term Interpretation
12 Enemy Squad Size Increasing enemy squad units by one decreases MOE by 1.75%
13 EN Hits to kill Increasing each enemy agent's available hit points by one decreases MOE by 7.8%
14 Enemy Sensor Range (m) Increasing enemy senor range by 1000 meters causes a 5% decrease in MOE
15 Enemy Organic Contact Persistence Has marginal effect on MOE in this scenario
* indicates factors which have interactions with other factors and/or nonlinear effects  
Figure 29.   List of all the experimental factors and their impact on the Full scenario 
simulation model based on regression analysis.  The list is divided into 
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Figure 30.   Graphic display of the trends in the MOE when changing one factor with 
other factors held constant based on the regression model from this section.   
 
2. Critical Capabilities 
The purpose of this section is to use the simulation data in order to determine 
some of the critical capabilities required for logistically supporting a DO platoon.  For 
this analysis, all of the data from all five scenarios is considered.  Using the critical 
factors from the previous section as a guide, this section determines acceptable ranges for 
all of the controllable parameters that can then be used to generate a support plan in the 
next chapter.  This section makes heavy use of classification and regression trees, which, 
according to Cornell University’s Office of Statistical Consulting, “...provide a simple 
rule for classification or prediction of observations... handle interactions among variables 
in a straightforward way... can easily handle a large number of predictor variables, and 
...do not require assumptions about the distribution of the data.” (Cornell University 
Office of Statistical Consulting Website, August 2005)  Essentially the regression tree 
process uses the nature of the data itself to decide how to sub-categorize the data and 
accounts for interactions implicitly.  In order to make decisions that are not unduly 
sensitive to the enemy threat level, the data was summarized across the range of noise 
factors for each unique set of decision factors. 
54 
a. Scenario 
Figure 31 shows a regression tree on the data considering only partitions 
on the five scenarios.  Interpreting the tree model is simple.  Factors at the top of the tree 
are most important.  Splits to the right are for improvements in the MOE.  To use the tree 
as a prediction tool, one reads it from the top down following the appropriate branches 
for the case which is being considered. As stated in the previous section, the full scenario 
seems to be the best; however, all three top performing models have rapid request 
systems.  Additionally, adding a surveillance capability to the resupply aircraft produces 
the two top performing scenarios.  From this, it is reasonable to conclude that the best 
support system for a DO platoon must have the capability to receive, process, and 
respond to rapid requests.  Additionally, aerial surveillance can considerably improve the 
performance of the platoon in a mission designed interdict an enemy who does not want 
to be found. 
These conclusions give rise to the following question, “What general 
conditions must be met for the DO platoon to be comparably successful on average under 
the two least desirable scenarios?”  For the Scheduled Resupply Only (SchedOnly) 
scenario, a tree model suggests that for the platoon to have comparable success, it must 
have a high resupply speed, a usage rate in contact that is no more than double the rate 
out of contact, and have the capacity for at least three DOS.  For the Sense and Respond 
Only (NoRR) scenario, to have comparable performance all that is required is a high 
resupply speed and a usage rate in contact no more than three times the normal rate.  The 
upper bound on usage rate is not important if there is a long lead time in the sense and 
respond system and the resupply conduct time can be kept short.   
What this means is that for sense and respond logistics alone to work as 
well on average as the Full scenario with sense and respond and rapid request, it must 
travel quickly, anticipate requirements more than six hours in advance, have a low 
casualty rate (or alternative means for medical evacuations), and deliver efficiently.  An 
exclusive scheduled resupply policy works well when demand and casualty rates are very 
low and the platoon can carry at least three DOS.  This might work in a very permissive 
environment where the risks involved are more similar to those of border patrol agents.  
The ultimate conclusion of this section is that while it is possible to have success with 
several logistics policies, the policies that contain rapid request seem to be the most 
robust across all battlefield parameters, are not as sensitive to usage rates, and can be 
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Figure 31.   Regression tree considering only scenarios.  The best performing scenarios 
all have rapid request systems. 
 
b. Logistical Parameters 
Since the purpose of this section is to identify capabilities, the selection of 
critical logistical capabilities is made as independently of the scenario as possible.  This 
gives the logistician the best mix of capabilities to use across a range of possible concepts 
of support.  The factors addressed here are those that are most amenable to control 
through technological, organizational, or doctrinal means.  They are resupply speed, rapid 
request setup time, sense and respond lead time, DOS, controlled supply rate (CSR), 
resupply conduct time and resupply stealth.   
In order to better identify the effect of sense and respond lead time and 
CSR, another simple simulation experiment was done, this time with the DO platoon 
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performing its mission for fourteen days using the Full scenario.  This experiment 
consisted of five levels of DOS (1 through 5) crossed with five levels of CSR (1 through 
5), crossed with two levels of lead time (0 and 12 hours), crossed with two levels of 
enemy squad size (7 and 13 enemies per squad).  All other parameters were set at 
nominal values contained in Appendix B.  This resulted in 100 design points which were 
run ten times each for a total of 1000 data points.  An interesting thing happened in this 
experiment. The combat demands were so stable across the experiment that the sense and 
respond logistics system dominated.  Scheduled resupply missions never occur in this 
experiment.  However, as Figure 32 shows, three DOS is a natural split between high and 
low performance.  Additionally, a long sense and respond lead time is most important 
when the capacity in DOS is small, but a long sense and respond lead time stabilizes 
performance over the range of DOS.  As a result, it is recommended that the DO platoon 
have the capacity to carry three DOS and that the supporting agency be prepared to 
launch push packages at least twelve hours in advance of anticipated need.  These general 
conclusions are also supported by the seven day experimental data with all five scenarios 
aggregated. 
The next thing that needs to be addressed is the CSR.  If the DO platoon 
carries three DOS, how often should scheduled delivery missions take place?  The data 
analysis thus far and the contour plots in Figure 33 show that three and four DOS give 
about the same effectiveness, so long as scheduled resupply missions are less than or 
equal to DOS.  A contour plot is a way to visualize the MOE as a function of two factors, 
DOS and CSR in this case.  The color shows the average value of the MOE at the values 
of the factors on the axes.  It is therefore recommended that a preliminary conclusion 
from the MCWL DO Wargame I Analysis Report, which suggests that the DO platoon 
carry three DOS and be resupplied every two days, be implemented as a capability. 
The next two capabilities to be addressed are resupply speed, and rapid 
request setup time.  Since these factors interact, they will be looked at together and only 
in those scenarios where rapid request was active.  Figure 34 shows that setup time is less 
important when there is fast delivery speed and more important with slow delivery speed.  
The regression tree split at 231 kilometers per hour corresponds to between 10 and 15  
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Figure 32.   Surface plot and regression tree showing the effects of DOS and sense and 
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Figure 33.   Contour plots show that CSR must be less than DOS, which is intuitive.  
Going to five DOS can reduce volatility, but it is likely too much to carry.  
[Best viewed in color]  
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minutes transit time by resupply aircraft.  Since responsiveness, represented by these two 
factors, is critical to success, it is recommended that the agency supporting the DO 
platoon have the capacity to do both well.  For example, when supporting a mission far 
away or in bad weather, the combat service support (CSS) agency could make up for the 
loss in delivery speed by having resupply packages and medical evacuation on standby 
alert to minimize setup time.  In a more complex and austere operational environment, 
where having supplies and aircraft on standby is not feasible, the supporting agency must 
either be near the DO platoon, or have very fast delivery means.  In either case, the CSS 
agency must have good communications with the DO platoon, easy access to the delivery 
aircraft, and sufficient battlefield intelligence to conduct a safe delivery.   
 
Figure 34.   Regression tree considering only rapid request setup time and resupply 
speed in those scenarios where rapid request was used.  It shows the 
interaction between the two factors. 
Lastly, resupply conduct time and resupply stealth are addressed.  Recall 
that resupply conduct time is the amount of time it takes to execute a delivery or medical 
evacuation once the delivery craft arrives at the DO platoon’s location, and resupply 
stealth is the sensor signature of the delivery vehicles to the enemy.  In the simulation 
model, these factors do not have a great deal of explanatory power.  However, some 
insights can be gleaned from the data.  In the No Helicopter Intelligence scenario (No 
Helo) these two factors can be addressed since detection of a resupply event by the 
enemy is not mitigated by aerial over watch.  Figure 35 graphically illustrates the 
interaction between these factors.  The general trends indicate that if the resupply conduct 
time is longer, then it must be conducted with more stealth or with over watch.  In terms 
of capabilities, this would translate into stealthy delivery methods, such as night air drop, 
or providing armed escorts to the delivery aircraft, such as Cobra attack helicopters.  
Another option would be to provide the DO platoon with organic unmanned aerial 
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vehicles.  However, since adding these capabilities would likely be expensive, it is nice to 
know that improving responsiveness factors by small amounts has a much greater overall 
impact on the MOE.  It is important to note here, that due to model limitations, the 
enemies are unable to attack resupply aircraft, so the effects of stealth and resupply 
conduct time are likely underestimated by the simulation model for an enemy with the 
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Figure 35.   The interaction between stealth and resupply conduct time in the NoHelo 
scenario.  [Best viewed in color] 
 
c. Summary 
In this section, critical factors were translated into critical capabilities by 
analyzing the simulation output data.  In summary, the CSS supporting agency must have 
a great deal of flexibility in its responsiveness through solid communications, 
intelligence, access to aircraft, and pre-planned resupply packages.  The DO platoon 
should be able to carry three DOS and be resupplied no less frequently than every two 
days.  A sense and respond or push logistics system should plan on launching resupply 
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missions twelve hours in advance of an anticipated stock-out or system failure. Finally, 
the exchange of supplies with the DO platoon on the ground must be conducted quickly, 
with great stealth, or with over watch.  
 
C. FURTHER INSIGHTS 
This section captures some further insights gathered from the data analysis but are 
not directly related to the research questions.  The two major areas that will be covered 
here are the concept of stability versus instability and the importance of intelligence to a 
CSS agency. 
 
1. Stability versus Instability 
It is intuitive that responsive logistics is more important when the combat is more 
unstable.  Using regression trees to identify some natural criteria for stability and 
instability, all the seven day data was divided into two general categories, “STABLE” 
and “UNSTABLE”.  An unstable situation is defined as very high usage rates and very 
capable enemies.  The unstable situation corresponds to about three percent of the data, or 
5600 total runs.  Since the stable situation contains 97% of the data, which has already 
been analyzed, there are no additional insights to be gained from looking at it separately.  
However, looking at the unstable situation separately leads to some interesting insights.  
For the unstable scenario, resupply speed and stealth are the two most important 
parameters.  Having high speed resupply increases effectiveness by 150 percent in the 
unstable scenario. Since the majority of the scenarios include surveillance from the 
aircraft, lower stealth resupply missions attract more enemy and thus create more fire 
support missions.  For a low stealth setting, the unstable situation improves by 60 
percent.  This relates two key points.  First, fire support and aerial surveillance are much 
more critical when combat is unstable.  Secondly, and perhaps, most importantly, 
responsiveness remains the most important logistical factor.  Not only does this suggest 
the need for a dedicated aerial surveillance platform for the DO platoon, but it also shows 
that the CSS agency needs to know what kind of fight the platoon might be in, in order to 
design and execute its support plan. 
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2. CSS Intelligence 
As the data analysis has shown, especially the interaction plots in Figure 27, there 
are times when increasing speed can make up for slow response time.  There is also an 
interaction with stealth and resupply conduct time.  The natural splits in rapid request set 
up time in the regression tress correspond directly to the expected time between enemy 
attacks. The CSS agency must be able to determine where to allocate scarce resources.  
Perhaps it is necessary that deliveries are stealthy or speedy for a particular mission. The 
resupply mission must respond to demands before the enemy can launch its next attack.  
It may be necessary to locate the CSS agency closer to the DO platoon, or limit the 
distance at which the platoon can be employed.  Helicopters might need to be in direct 
support for a dangerous mission, but placed in general support for a more routine one.  
Essentially, the CSS agency must have intelligence equal to the maneuver commander in 
order to effectively develop a supporting concept.  Additionally, sufficient intelligence is 
required to determine resupply locations, escort requirements, and numerous other issues. 
While this is certainly true of all logistics operations, it seems to be particularly true for 
distributed operations, especially given the MEU’s limited resources.  It is recommended 
that logisticians supporting a DO platoon have access to full intelligence during the 
planning of the operation and have continuous intelligence updates or access to the 
common operational picture throughout execution to ensure that logistics operations 
support the DO platoon rather than constrain it. 
 
D. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENT  
There are many insights to be gained from analyzing the data from the simulation 
experiment, and many that this research simply does not have time to address.  However, 
the whole data analysis leads directly to one conclusion.  Responsiveness is the key 
logistical criteria for success for long term DO platoon operations.  The most critical 
logistical factors are responsiveness, combat usage rate, and DOS.  The critical 
capabilities are as follows: 
• The DO platoon must have the capacity to carry three DOS.  
• The CSS agency must have the ability to sustain scheduled resupply 
deliveries every two days. 
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• The CSS agency must be assigned dedicated responsive, high speed 
delivery means. 
• The CSS agency must have pre-staged resupply packages at the CSS area. 
• The CSS agency must have good communications with the DO platoon.  
• An anticipatory (or sense and respond) logistics system should launch 
missions twelve hours ahead of a predicted stock out or equipment failure. 
• Resupply deliveries must be accomplished quickly, stealthily, or with 
heavy security (or a combination of all three). 
• The CSS agency must have accurate, up to date intelligence on the DO 
platoon’s operations. 
• Logistical responsiveness, intelligence, aerial surveillance, and fire 
support are critical for unstable or extremely dangerous missions. 
• The best performing logistics system (based on those modeled and 
analyzed) combines rapid request, fast delivery, aerial surveillance, a 
scheduled resupply rate, three or more DOS capacity, and a sense and 
respond logistics capability. 
This summarizes the lessons learned from the analysis of the data from the simulation 
experiment.  In the next chapter, the physical requirements of the DO platoon will be 




V. DEVELOPING A CONCEPT OF SUPPORT 
This chapter of the research is dedicated to answering the final research question 
and tying all the research insights together into coherent advice for logistical planners.  
This final question is, “What is the supportability of the distributed operations (DO) 
platoon across the range of missions?”  This is a very broad question with a quite simple 
answer:  It depends.  Depending on the mission, the enemy, and the environment, 
supporting a DO platoon will be more or less taxing on a Marine Expeditionary Unit’s 
(MEU) resources, which will affect the MEU’s capabilities as a whole.  The goal of this 
chapter is to first answer the question, “How much?” and secondly to answer the 
question, “How?”  This portion of the analysis begins with an assessment of the logistical 
requirements of the DO platoon for a typical mission, like the one analyzed through 
simulation.  After this, a concept is developed that supports these requirements, taking 
into account the conclusions from the data analysis.  Finally, this chapter ends with 
advice on developing a logistical estimate of supportability based on the results of this 
research.  Ultimately, this chapter answers the final question by giving the reader an 
appreciation for the resources necessary to sustain the DO platoon and general advice for 
developing a logistical estimate.  With this chapter in hand, a Marine logistician should 
be able to begin to assess the supportability of a DO platoon across the range of missions. 
 
A. REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION 
Determining logistical requirements is not the exact science that it might seem, 
and it becomes more inexact as a logistician attempts to predict what a small unit might 
need over the course of a day.  Planning factors work well for large units in traditional 
engagements, but are difficult to apply to a DO platoon operating in new ways with new 
equipment.  As a result of these difficulties, the author used a combination of operational 
experience from supporting infantry and armored units in Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
standard Marine Corps logistical planning factors.  These planning factors are published 
in “A Logistician’s Reference,” a compact disc published by the Combat Service Support 
Section of the MAGTF Staff Training Program as a compilation of all Marine Corps 
logistical planning factors.  This section progresses through each of the various supply 
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classes and determines how much would be required for a one day resupply of the DO 
platoon for a mission like that presented in Chapter II.  Classes VI (personal demand 
items), VII (major end items), and X (civil support) are not considered since they would 
not be part of a typical tactical resupply mission for a mobile DO platoon.  This section 
concludes with an assessment of the total weight and volume of supplies required to 
support the platoon as a function of days of supply (DOS). 
 
1. Class I:  Subsistence 
There are two components of Class I:  rations and water.  While demand for food 
is quite simple, water can be complex.  People use different amounts of water based on 
environmental factors and activity levels. 
a. Rations 
The DO platoon will need to be supplied with three MREs for each DOS 
carried.  Three MREs weigh a total of 5.58 pounds and occupy 0.386 cubic feet of space.  
b. Water 
The DO platoon will use approximately three gallons of water per man per 
day in a temperate environment and five gallons per man per day in a hot environment, 
based on standard planning factors.  During OIF, the author used a planning factor of four 
gallons per man per day to support a mechanized infantry company in combat during the 
Iraqi spring with good success.  As a result, four gallons per man per day is a good 
general planning factor for an unknown environment which allows a Marine to have 
plenty of drinking water if he conserves it carefully.  However, it must be noted that 
water consumption can be drastically higher during intense combat operations for 
infantrymen who must exert themselves physically for long periods of time.  This fact 
can contribute to uncertainty in the water requirement.  As the simulation results indicate, 
having a high or uncertain demand rate beyond the normal planning factors can have an 
adverse impact on the mission unless the support system is highly responsive.  Four 
gallons of water weighs 33.38 pounds and takes up 0.535 cubic feet of space.  Since 
carrying more than two gallons of water in individual equipment is awkward, the 
additional water would have to be carried on the ITV or stored in five gallon jugs at a 
patrol base.  Using strict water conservation measures, the daily requirement for an 
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individual Marine could be reduced to as low as two gallons per day if mission 
requirements dictate. 
 
2. Class II: General Supplies 
General supplies are essential items that are often overlooked in planning.  These 
include administrative supplies, tools, replacement canteens, toilet paper, chemical lights 
and hundreds of other items.  It is nearly impossible to determine exactly which items 
will be required, but for a DO platoon there are several items that should be on hand.  
These include chemical lights, especially the infrared variety, toilet paper, heavy duty 
tape, map pens, waterproof paper and acetate, parachute cord (also 550lb test cord), rope, 
and replacement personal equipment.  High priority for replacement equipment is water 
and fuel carrying containers and canteens which are easily damaged by shrapnel and 
accident.  The standard planning factor for Class II is 3.6 pounds per day per person, with 
the volume depending entirely on what type of items are required.  A good thumb rule is 
that 3.6 pounds of dry goods is about two MREs or 0.138 cubic feet.  These items are 
usually provided based on rapid requests, but certain items, including chemical lights and 
toilet paper, should be considered continuous demand items that will need to be provided 
routinely.  
 
3. Class III:  Fuel and Lubricants 
There are two aspects of Class III: fuel to run equipment and lubricants to 
maintain it.  
a. Fuel 
For many missions, the DO platoon will be employed with eleven total 
internally transportable vehicles (ITV).  The ITV is currently in later stages of 
development, but exact fuel planning factors were not available for this analysis at this 
time.  As a result, the planning factors for the High Mobility, Multi-purpose, Wheeled 
Vehicle (HMMWV) are used.  Since the ITV is much smaller and lighter than a 
HMMWV, it will likely use less fuel per hour of operation, but it may be used more 
intensively by a more distributed force.  The infantry HMMWV planning factor is for 
eight hours a day of operation using 1.7 gallons per hour.  This equates to about 13.6 
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gallons of fuel per day per vehicle weighing 90.5 pounds and occupying 1.82 cubic feet 
of space. 
b. Lubricants 
Lubricants, like Class II, are critical, yet often overlooked.  For a long 
term operation, an infantry unit in an expeditionary environment will have to conduct 
preventive maintenance on weapons and vehicles.  CLP (stands for Cleaning, Lubricant, 
and Preservative), the standard cleaning and maintenance oil for infantry weapons, will 
need to be planned for and supplied continuously.  Lubricants for standard preventive 
maintenance will need to be included for the ITV as well.  An operational lesson learned 
by the author in combat is to take empty liter sized plastic water bottles and fill them with 
engine oil, brake fluid, and transmission fluid and store them on the vehicle.  Having a 
vehicle fail in a firefight over a slow transmission leak is not an option.  Typically, 
resupply of lubricants is done in response to a need for a specific type, but small 
quantities of all major types, including those already mentioned, should be on hand 
during a routine resupply.  The planning factor is about approximately half a pound per 
man per day.  This is about 0.06 gallons or 0.008 cubic feet.  These items, other than a 
small bottle of CLP, should be carried on board the ITV. 
 
4. Class IV:  Barrier and Construction Materials 
Class IV materials are typically used by infantrymen to construct prepared 
defenses.  Included in this class are sandbags, concertina wire, metal stakes, and lumber.  
This class may or may not be required, depending on the mission, but the DO platoon 
should always deploy with empty sandbags.  Several strands of concertina wire and metal 
stakes should be included if vehicle space allows.  Concertina wire, stakes, and sandbags 
allow the hasty construction of checkpoints, prisoner holding areas, and prepared 
defenses.  The standard planning factor for Class IV for defensive purposes is 4.29 
pounds per man per day.  For the whole platoon this amounts to 188 pounds.  Since these 
items are really mission dependent and may not be required for many DO missions, 
specific requirements will not be computed as part of the basic load or routine resupply 
mission.  However, it is recommended that a relatively small number of empty sandbags 
(about 100) are included in each routine resupply mission.  Obviously, strands of 
concertina wire would only be supportable in the event that the platoon is employed with 
ITVs. 
 
5. Class V:  Ammunition 
There are two components to supplying Marines with ammunition.  The first 
component is the basic combat load, which is the total amount of ammo that the unit 
would carry into a single engagement.  It could also be considered the unit’s ammunition 
carrying capacity.  Since in typical combat, some areas are typically more heavily 
engaged than others, planning factors are skewed lower due to the low usage rate of 
command and support troops.  Individual units will typically not need ammunition 
resupply until they have an engagement, and after the engagement they will need more 
ammunition than typical planning factors indicate.  A basic combat load for the DO 
platoon is identified based on an infantry threat and a resupply package is developed 
based on basic assumptions about a typical engagement.  Figure 36 shows the weapon 
mix of the platoon. 
TAMCN NOMENCLATURE TOTAL 
WEAPONS
E0892 LAUNCHER GRENADE 40MM M203 9
E0960 M249 (SAW) 9
E0984 MACHINE GUN  50 CAL, M2 4
E0989 MG 7.62MM  M240G 3
E0994 MACHINE GUN MK19 40MM 4
E1250 PISTOL 9MM 2
E1441 RIFLE 5.56MM 35  
Figure 36.   This figure shows the individual weapons of the DO platoon.  The TAMCN 
is the reference number of the weapon on the Table of Authorized Material. 
 
a. Basic Combat Load 
Figure 37 shows a basic combat issue of ammunition for the DO platoon 
based on infantry threat planning factors.  Signal pyrotechnics and grenade quantities 
were increased to account for the dispersed nature of platoon operations.  Thermite 
grenades were added for each ITV in case vehicles had to be abandoned in an emergency.  
The total size of the basic combat load is nearly 3,300 pounds and 77 cubic feet. 
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DODIC Nomenclature WPN Rounds Total Total Total 
TAMCN Per Weapon Rounds Weight Cube
A059 CTG, 5.56MM BALL E1441 350 12,250 502 12
A063 CTG, 5.56MM TRACER E1441 10 350 17 1
A064 CTG, 5.56MM 4 & 1 LINKED E0960 800 7,200 439 14
A131 CTG, 7.62MM 4 & 1 LINKED E0989 800 2,400 242 5
A363 CTG, 9MM BALL E1250 30 60 4 0
A576 CTG, CAL .50 4 & 1 LINKED E0984 400 2,000 790 12
B504 CTG, 40MM GREEN STAR PARACHUTE E0892 0.3 5 5 0
B505 CTG, 40MM RED STAR PARACHUTE E0892 0.3 5 5 0
B506 CTG, 40MM RED SMOKE GROUND E0892 0.25 5 5 0
B508 CTG, 40MM GREEN SMOKE GROUND E0892 0.5 5 5 0
B509 CTG, 40MM YELLOW SMOKE GROUND E0892 0.25 5 5 0
B535 CTG, 40MM WHITE STAR PARACHUTE E0892 2 18 19 0
B542 CTG, 40MM HEDP LINKED FOR MK19 E0994 288 1,152 864 23
B546 CTG, 40MM HEDP FOR M79/M203 E0892 18 162 119 3
G881 GRENADE, HAND FRAGMENTATION INDIV 1 PER INDIVIDUAL 44 75 2
G900 GRENADE, HAND INCENDIARY TH3 INDIV 1 PER ITV 11 32 1
G930 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE HC INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 13 0
G940 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE GREEN INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 13 0
G945 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE YELLOW INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 13 0
G950 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE RED INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 13 0
G955 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE VIOLET INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 13 0
L306 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND RSC INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 8 0
L307 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND WSC INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 8 0
L311 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND RSP INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 8 0
L312 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND WSP INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 8 0
L314 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND GSC INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 8 0
L323 SIGNAL, SMOKE GROUND RP INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 8 0
L324 SIGNAL, SMOKE GROUND GP INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 8 0
L495 FLARE, SURFACE TRIP INDIV 1 PER SQUAD OR HQ 5 9 0
Total 3,258 77  
Figure 37.   A potential basic combat ammunition load for the DO platoon against an 
infantry threat.  The DODIC is the Department of Defense Identification 
Code of each particular ammunition type. 
 
b. Resupply  
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, small units cannot be 
resupplied ammunition by planning factor.  Either they have been in a fight or not.  The 
resupply package shown in Figure 38 is based on 15% of the combat load.  This amount 
is based on the assumption that an individual squad would use less than half of its basic 
load of ammunition in a fire fight before it is reinforced or breaks contact.  Half of one 
squad’s ammunition comprises about 15% of the total platoon load.  It is recommended 
that several resupply packages of this type be prepared in advance for rapid delivery to 
the DO platoon.  At 489 pounds and 12 cubic feet, it is a fairly manageable resupply 
package, but it should be tailored to the mission. 
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DODIC Nomenclature WPN 15% Total Total 
TAMCN Rounds Weight Cube
A059 CTG, 5.56MM BALL E1441 1,838 75 2
A063 CTG, 5.56MM TRACER E1441 53 3 0
A064 CTG, 5.56MM 4 & 1 LINKED E0960 1,080 66 2
A131 CTG, 7.62MM 4 & 1 LINKED E0989 360 36 1
A363 CTG, 9MM BALL E1250 9 1 0
A576 CTG, CAL .50 4 & 1 LINKED E0984 300 119 2
B504 CTG, 40MM GREEN STAR PARACHUTE E0892 1 1 0
B505 CTG, 40MM RED STAR PARACHUTE E0892 1 1 0
B506 CTG, 40MM RED SMOKE GROUND E0892 1 1 0
B508 CTG, 40MM GREEN SMOKE GROUND E0892 1 1 0
B509 CTG, 40MM YELLOW SMOKE GROUND E0892 1 1 0
B535 CTG, 40MM WHITE STAR PARACHUTE E0892 3 3 0
B542 CTG, 40MM HEDP LINKED FOR MK19 E0994 173 130 3
B546 CTG, 40MM HEDP FOR M79/M203 E0892 24 18 0
G881 GRENADE, HAND FRAGMENTATION INDIV 7 11 0
G900 GRENADE, HAND INCENDIARY TH3 INDIV 2 5 0
G930 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE HC INDIV 1 2 0
G940 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE GREEN INDIV 1 2 0
G945 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE YELLOW INDIV 1 2 0
G950 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE RED INDIV 1 2 0
G955 GRENADE, HAND SMOKE VIOLET INDIV 1 2 0
L306 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND RSC INDIV 1 1 0
L307 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND WSC INDIV 1 1 0
L311 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND RSP INDIV 1 1 0
L312 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND WSP INDIV 1 1 0
L314 SIGNAL, ILLUM GROUND GSC INDIV 1 1 0
L323 SIGNAL, SMOKE GROUND RP INDIV 1 1 0
L324 SIGNAL, SMOKE GROUND GP INDIV 1 1 0
L495 FLARE, SURFACE TRIP INDIV 1 1 0
489 12  
Figure 38.   A squad half load which could be used as a standard resupply package. 
 
6. Class VIII:  Medical Supplies 
The planning factor for medical supplies is 1.22 pounds per man per day.  Since 
this factor includes dental supplies, veterinary supplies, repair parts for medical 
equipment, and numerous other things that would be of no concern to a DO platoon, the 
factor for this research is assumed to be 0.5 pounds per man per day.  Typical things 
included for the DO platoon might be field dressings, compression bandages, tourniquets, 
water purification tablets, anti-malarial medication, antibiotics, pain killers, et cetera.  
The battalion surgeon for the MEU’s battalion landing team should be consulted to 
determine what a routine resupply package in this area should look like.  Based on the 
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size of an MRE, 0.5 pounds of medical supplies would be approximately 0.019 cubic 
feet. 
 
7. Class IX: Repair Parts and Batteries 
Repair parts and batteries fall into the hard to define category.  Planning factors 
for weight exist, but they do not help a logistician determine whether the next resupply 
mission will need to carry a spare tire or a new gun barrel.  While autonomic logistics 
technologies will help in this area to some degree by providing feedback on equipment as 
it wears out, it will not be able to predict the next flat tire or fire fight.  The DO platoon 
carries a tremendous amount of sensors and radios which will certainly require frequent 
battery resupply.  The planning factor for a lightly engaged mechanized unit is 3.43 
pounds/man/day.  If this amount was converted directly into AA sized batteries, which 
can be used to power much of the current field technology, it would be about 54 AA 
batteries per day.  Assuming half the planning factor weight is used for actual 
replacement parts for vehicles, weapons, and radios, this would amount to 22 AA 
batteries per man per day.  This is roughly four batteries per gadget per day for each 
member of the DO platoon.  This factor seems reasonable, although some batteries 
should be rechargeable using the ITV and a battery charger.  Based on this assessment, 
3.43 pounds per man per day seems to be a reasonable upper bound planning factor for 
the platoon.  This amounts to approximately 0.016 cubic feet.   
 
8. Total DO Platoon Requirements 
Figure 39 summarizes the daily supply requirement for each Marine and each 
ITV.  The basic combat load of ammunition per Marine is about 35 pounds.  Each 
vehicle’s combat ammunition load is approximately 150 pounds.  Each ITV would have 
to carry the balance of each fire team’s water requirement, which is 8 gallons for the first 
day and 16 gallons for each additional day.  A Marine’s individual load bearing 
equipment can carry 120 pounds and about 3.4 cubic feet.  (Marine Corps Systems 
Command Website, 2005)  Adding days of supply increases the amount of supplies 
required for all listed classes of supply except ammunition.  Figure 40 shows the daily 
requirements as a function of days of supply.  Notice that for an individual Marine, three 
DOS utilizes the full volume capacity of the load bearing equipment.  In the next section, 





Requirement Weight/Marine Cube/Marine Weight/ITV Cube/ITV
Class I
MRE 5.58 0.39 5.58 0.39
Water 33.36 0.54 16.68 0.27 66.72 1.07
Class II 3.60 0.14 3.60 0.14
Class III (vehicles only)
Lubricants 2.00 0.55 2.00 0.55
Fuel 90.50 1.82 90.50 1.82
Class V (basic load)
Marines 36.45 0.95 36.45 0.95
Vehicles 150.36 3.18 150.36 3.18
Class VIII
Medical Supplies 0.50 0.02 0.50 0.02
Class IX
Batteries/Repair Parts 3.43 0.02 3.43 0.02
Individual Total 66.24 1.78 309.58 6.62
Platoon Total 2,914.76 78.37 3,405.42 72.86
Platoon Total 
less Ammunition 1,310.76 36.37 1,751.42 37.86  
Figure 39.   This figure shows the total supply requirement (excluding Class IV), for 





















1 66 2 310 7 6,320 151 3,062 74
2 79 3 469 10 8,648 225 5,390 148
3 92 3 628 14 10,977 300 7,719 223
4 106 4 787 17 13,305 374 10,047 297
5 119 5 946 20 15,633 448 12,375 371  
Figure 40.   This shows the supply requirement as function of days of supply.  A 
routine resupply does not include ammunition.  Three DOS is highlighted 
as the maximum volume that an individual Marine can carry. 
 
B. DEVELOPING A SUPPORT CONCEPT 
This section develops a support concept based on the scenario, from Chapter II, 
the simulation results from Chapter IV, and the logistical requirements identified in the 
previous section.  Since the platoon will be resupplied by aviation assets, the typical 
aviation mix of a MEU is listed below: 
• 12 CH-46 medium lift helicopters (Sea Knight) 
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• Scheduled for replacement by the MV-22 (Osprey) medium lift tilt 
rotor aircraft 
• 4 CH-53E heavy lift helicopters (Super Stallion) 
• 2-4 UH-1N light utility helicopters (Huey) 
• 4 AH-1W light attack helicopters (Super Cobra) 
• 6 AV-8B VTOL fixed wing light attack aircraft (Harrier) 
• 2 KC-130 tanker/cargo aircraft (not embarked on ships) 
This information was compiled from the Federation of American Scientists Website 
(fas.org), and the GlobalSecurity.org website in August 2005, as well as the author’s 
operational experience. 
 
1. Transportation Requirements 
The scenario in Chapter II describes a DO platoon operating in an austere, 
mountainous environment without secure ground lines of communication.  As a result, 
aircraft lift capacity is diminished by higher altitude operations.  Additionally, due to the 
importance of speed of transit, and the requirement for maneuverability and survivability, 
external lift should be ruled out.  Figure 41 shows the internal lift capacities of MEU 
cargo helicopters at 4000 feet elevation in a hot climate for a 30 nautical mile round trip 
mission, which provides a conservative estimate. These were derived from military 
















CH-46 603 3,890 145 6,000
MV-22 398 8,000 240 13,850
CH-53 1,386 18,600 130 35,000  
Figure 41.   Internal payload capacity for MEU cargo helicopters for a 30 nautical mile 
round trip at 4000ft and 90 degrees Fahrenheit.  (after MIL-STD-1366D, 
1998). 
From Figure 40, a three DOS resupply mission, without ammunition, is about 
7,700 pounds and 220 cubic feet.  To lift this would require the full capacity of two CH-
46 aircraft, without leaving any room for an ammunition load.  Assuming a typical 
ammunition resupply is three squad half loads (Figure 38), the ammunition adds an 
additional 1,467 pounds and 36 cubic feet.  Two CH-46 aircraft could not carry three 
DOS with three squad half loads to 4,000 feet on a hot day, but could carry the load under 
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more ideal conditions.  For the mission in this scenario, a three DOS resupply mission 
with ammunition, would require four CH-46 helicopters since Marine aircraft always fly 
in pairs (Mislick, 2005).  Two MV-22 aircraft could easily handle the weight 
requirements for three DOS with ammunition at the given conditions and provide 
considerable additional flexibility since it is much faster, has additional range, can be 
refueled in flight, and can fly at much higher altitudes (Federation of American Scientists 
Website, 2005).  The CH-53 is capable of carrying five DOS for the entire platoon with a 
basic load of ammunition in one aircraft.  Using the CH-53 seems to be overkill for a 
platoon mission, but since the MV-22 has not yet been fielded, it may be required for 
certain missions requiring higher altitude operations, such as those in Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan.  It should be noted that the C-130 aircraft could air drop the 
platoon’s required supplies, which may be useful, especially when a clandestine night 
airdrop is important to the mission.  However, since resupply by C-130 cannot evacuate 
casualties or prisoners, it is ruled out for this mission. 
 
2. Employment 
Based on a controlled resupply rate (CSR) of every two days, a pair of CH-46 
helicopters could carry the required 5,400 pounds of supplies plus four squad half loads 
of ammunition at a total weight of 7,350 pounds.  This would require the MEU to 
dedicate two CH-46 aircraft to remain in direct support of the DO platoon throughout its 
operation.  In order to provide security for the resupply missions, each resupply flight 
would need to be escorted by two AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters.  The Cobras could 
loiter over landing zones and provide surveillance, coordinate fire missions, and engage 
enemies while the platoon is engaged in receiving supplies from the CH-46 helicopters.   
Since responsiveness is the most critical supporting factor, supplies should be pre-
staged and separated into fire team sized packages.  A two day package (without 
ammunition) would weigh about 500 pounds.  This would allow for quick on and off 
loading, as well as reducing the amount of time it takes the platoon to internally distribute 
supplies.  Having the Cobra over watch would allow the CH-46’s the security to deliver 
to each squad individually rather than requiring internal redistribution over a large area. 
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The helicopters will also pick up casualties and enemy prisoners and return them to the 
MEU. 
Based on the results from the data analysis, the aircraft transit time should be 
limited to less than 15 minutes combined with a mission setup time of less than 4 hours.  
Based on Figure 41, which shows airspeed as a function of distance and flight time, to be 
supported by the CH-46, the platoon must be no further than 30 nautical miles or 55 
kilometers from the supporting agency.  The introduction of the MV-22 will increase the 
range to over 100 kilometers, but makes using the Cobra as an escort infeasible.  In order 
to keep mission setup time less than four hours, helicopters and flight crews must be on 
hand in addition to having pre-staged supply and ammunition packages.  Keeping 
response time short will also require the CSS agency to have constant communications 
with the DO platoon in order to effectively anticipate its requirements and react to 
problems. The following list summarizes a support concept for the DO platoon for the 
scenario in this thesis: 
• The DO platoon carries 3 DOS and combat ammo load 
• Two CH-46 assigned in direct support transporting supplies internally 
• Two AH-1W assigned for escort and landing zone security 
• 2 DOS resupply packages pre-staged and organized into fire team sized 
packages 
• CSS agency located within 55 kilometers of the DO platoon 
• Pilots, aircraft, and supply and ammunition packages on standby to keep 
response time less than four hours 
• CSS agency in continuous contact with DO platoon in order to track 
requirements and respond to demands 
Assuming that at any given time, approximately 20% of MEU aircraft are not 
available due to maintenance (based on maintenance planning factors), supporting the 
DO platoon with this concept would leave the MEU with an average of eight CH-46 and 
two AH-1W helicopters to support the rest of the MEU’ s missions.  Depending on the 
priority of the DO platoon’s mission in the context of MEU operations as a whole, and 
the degree of risk involved, this supporting concept may or may not be feasible for the 
MEU.  If it is not feasible, great care must be taken to assess the risks associated with a 
particular DO mission and other potential concepts of support.  Additionally, 
consideration must be given to insertion and extraction of the DO platoon and its 
vehicles, which is beyond the scope of this research.  In the next section, some guidelines 
based on this research are developed to help assess the supportability of the DO platoon 
from the MEU. 
Distance Flight Time
Kilometers Nautical Miles 2 min 4 min 6 min 8 min 10 min 12 min 14 min 16 min 18 min 20 min
5 3 81 kt 41 kt 27 kt 20 kt 16 kt 14 kt 12 kt 10 kt 9 kt 8 kt
10 5 162 kt 81 kt 54 kt 41 kt 32 kt 27 kt 23 kt 20 kt 18 kt 16 kt
15 8 243 kt 122 kt 81 kt 61 kt 49 kt 41 kt 35 kt 30 kt 27 kt 24 kt
20 11 324 kt 162 kt 108 kt 81 kt 65 kt 54 kt 46 kt 41 kt 36 kt 32 kt
25 14 405 kt 203 kt 135 kt 101 kt 81 kt 68 kt 58 kt 51 kt 45 kt 41 kt
30 16 486 kt 243 kt 162 kt 122 kt 97 kt 81 kt 69 kt 61 kt 54 kt 49 kt
35 19 567 kt 284 kt 189 kt 142 kt 113 kt 95 kt 81 kt 71 kt 63 kt 57 kt
40 22 648 kt 324 kt 216 kt 162 kt 130 kt 108 kt 93 kt 81 kt 72 kt 65 kt
45 24 729 kt 365 kt 243 kt 182 kt 146 kt 122 kt 104 kt 91 kt 81 kt 73 kt
50 27 810 kt 405 kt 270 kt 203 kt 162 kt 135 kt 116 kt 101 kt 90 kt 81 kt
55 30 891 kt 446 kt 297 kt 223 kt 178 kt 149 kt 127 kt 111 kt 99 kt 89 kt
60 32 972 kt 486 kt 324 kt 243 kt 194 kt 162 kt 139 kt 122 kt 108 kt 97 kt
65 35 1053 kt 527 kt 351 kt 263 kt 211 kt 176 kt 150 kt 132 kt 117 kt 105 kt
70 38 1134 kt 567 kt 378 kt 284 kt 227 kt 189 kt 162 kt 142 kt 126 kt 113 kt
75 41 1215 kt 608 kt 405 kt 304 kt 243 kt 203 kt 174 kt 152 kt 135 kt 122 kt
80 43 1296 kt 648 kt 432 kt 324 kt 259 kt 216 kt 185 kt 162 kt 144 kt 130 kt
85 46 1377 kt 689 kt 459 kt 344 kt 275 kt 230 kt 197 kt 172 kt 153 kt 138 kt
90 49 1458 kt 729 kt 486 kt 365 kt 292 kt 243 kt 208 kt 182 kt 162 kt 146 kt
95 51 1539 kt 770 kt 513 kt 385 kt 308 kt 257 kt 220 kt 192 kt 171 kt 154 kt
100 54 1620 kt 810 kt 540 kt 405 kt 324 kt 270 kt 231 kt 203 kt 180 kt 162 kt
Feasible MV-22 and CH-46
Feasilbe MV-22  
Figure 42.   This table shows the required airspeed in knots to achieve a particular flight 
time at a particular distance.  Blue cells indicate speeds feasible for the 
MV-22. Yellow indicates feasible for the CH-46 and MV-22.  [Best viewed 
in color] 
 
C. DEVELOPING AN ESTIMATE OF SUPPORTABILITY FOR A 
DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS PLATOON 
The goal of this research is not to provide a boiler plate supportability estimate for 
a DO platoon.  Its purpose is to provide simulated experience to decision makers through 
analysis of the problem.  Since a DO platoon has not been employed operationally, there 
are no logisticians in the Marine Corps with operational experience supporting one.  This 
analysis provides a surrogate for that experience which planners can use to begin to 
address the logistical challenges of supporting a DO platoon. 
Determining the supportability of the DO platoon will be based on many factors, 
including the degree of risk which the commander is willing to accept.  A time honored 
way for Marines to asses these factors during mission analysis is to conduct a METT-
TSL analysis where the acronym stands for:  “Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, 
Troops and Fire Support Available, and Time, Space, and Logistics.”  Using the lessons 
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learned during this analysis, each one of these areas is addressed with a focus on the 
effect it has on the supportability of the DO platoon. 
 
1. Mission 
The mission of the DO platoon is the most important consideration when 
developing an estimate of supportability.  Figure 43 lists the additive capabilities of the 
DO platoon.  Recall that the mission of the DO platoon in this thesis research utilized 
many of these capabilities, but focused on holding key terrain, interdicting enemy forces 
and controlling avenues of approach ― all at extended range.  This mission requires the 
platoon to operate independently for a long period of time, creating a high risk situation 
far from friendly lines of communication.  Shorter term missions, like a long range 
mounted patrol, may not need any resupply.  For this type of mission, the platoon could 
depart on a two day patrol mission aboard their ITVs and carry three DOS with them.  
The only logistical support that may be required during the mission would be casualty 
evacuation, which could be accomplished as part of an overall casualty evacuation plan 
for the MEU.  
 
Figure 43.   Reproduction of the list of additive capabilities of the DO platoon from 
Chapter 1.  (from Sea Viking 06 Distributed Operations Live Force 
Experimentation 25 Feb 05) 
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In summary, when analyzing the supportability of the DO platoon, a logistician 
should consider how far the mission will take the platoon from established lines of 
communication and support bases and for how long.  Figure 42 gives some rough 
guidance of the risk associated with operating at a range of distances by computing the 
expected flight time at a given airspeed.  Additionally, if the platoon’s mission has a high 
probability of direct action against the enemy, the ability of the support agency to 
respond to emergency requests must be greater. 
 
2. Enemy 
The enemy’s mission and capabilities are critical when determining a support 
concept for the DO platoon.  Enemy factors were some of the most critical in the 
simulation.  If the enemy has a robust air defense capability, resupply by helicopter may 
be difficult or impossible.  For this situation, air drop by C-130 may be a possible 
alternative using recently developed GPS guided parachutes that are capable of landing 
supplies within 200 meters of their intended target (Lisbon, 2004).  These parachutes 
have been successfully tested in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Conducting such air drops at 
night could prevent the loss of friendly helicopters and prevent the compromise of the 
DO platoon’s position.  If the enemy is not seen as a threat to aircraft and landing zone 
security is not an issue, then combat escorts may not be required for resupply helicopters.  
In a situation where compromising the platoon’s position creates a threat to the DO 
platoon, but helicopter delivery is the only acceptable means of sustainment, serious 
consideration should be given to including escort aircraft to provide added protection for 
the platoon while it is receiving a resupply.  Ultimately, when evaluating the 
supportability of the DO platoon, the logistician must consider the ability to protect both 
the resupply assets and the Marines who are made vulnerable by receiving them. 
 
3. Terrain and Weather 
The terrain between the MEU and the DO platoon and the terrain in which the 
platoon operates are critical factors.  If the elevation is high, the CH-46 might not be able 
to fly a resupply mission.  If the weather is very bad, low flying aircraft may not be able 
to provide support, forcing a ground resupply mission or causing a long delay in 
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response.  If a resupply mission had to fight its way to support the DO platoon over the 
ground, are there sufficient roads and combat assets to accomplish the mission?  A major 
risk of a mission that depends on aviation support is that it is highly susceptible to 
weather.  A logistician should fully understand the terrain and weather that the DO 
platoon may encounter over the length of the mission, in order to ensure that alternative 
means to sustain it over the length of the mission are available.  A good historical 
example to keep in mind is the recent loss of a CH-47 helicopter full of Navy SEALs in 
Afghanistan who were flying to the aid of a recon team under fire in Kunar province. 
(Gordon and Boylan, 2005) Against a determined foe in rugged terrain, the mission may 
be as risky for the resupply as it is for the DO platoon. 
 
4. Troops and Fire Support Available 
The supportability of the DO platoon will depend heavily on the ability to provide 
the necessary security to resupply missions.  The availability of escort aircraft and fire 
support to suppress enemy air defenses will be critical.  Additionally, escort aircraft can 
coordinate ground and air fire support for the DO platoon when it is most vulnerable.  For 
example, if the platoon takes casualties, it may not have the strength in numbers to 
continue an intense fight while providing security for an evacuation landing zone.  
Providing extra fire support during resupply missions could help mitigate this threat, as 
evidenced by the results of the simulation experiment.  An additional concern will be the 
logistical support of a fire support agency if it is not co-located with the combat service 
support area.  If the MEU has to provide logistics support to an artillery battery by air as 
well as the DO platoon, its resources to support other missions may be severely limited.  
The fielding of the MV-22 and the Expeditionary Fire Support System will greatly 
increase the MEU’s flexibility in this area. 
 
5. Time, Space, and Logistics 
Of all the factors considered, perhaps the most important to the logistician are the 
temporal and logistical constraints on the DO platoon’s mission.  How long will the 
platoon operate?  How quickly must resupply missions be executed?  Does the MEU 
have sufficient supplies on hand to sustain the DO platoon for the duration of the 
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mission?  Does the CSS agency have the option of setting up a forward support base or a 
forward arming and refueling point nearer to the DO platoon in order to provide quicker 
response or longer range?  The watchword of logistics is responsiveness.  When 
considering the supportability of the DO platoon, the physical constraints of the MEU’s 
limited resources will always impact the achievable level of responsiveness.  There will 
always be a way to support one platoon, but if the level of responsiveness is not adequate 
to the risk of the mission, then it is not supportable. 
 
D. SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter analyzes the requirements of the DO platoon and uses 
them in conjunction with lessons learned from the simulation experiment to generate a 
support concept and guidance for developing an estimate of supportability.  This chapter 
provides the means to answer the third research question: What is the supportability of 
the DO platoon across the range of missions?  With the supply requirements along with 
the MEU’s support capabilities analyzed and tabulated in this chapter, a MEU logistician 
should be able to asses the supportability of the DO platoon for any mission.  As most 
logisticians realize, supporting a single infantry platoon is generally not complicated.  
Supporting a DO platoon is made complicated by the risk to both the platoon and the 
resupply assets caused by the lack of secure lines of communication and the distances 
involved.  In order for the MEU to effectively support the DO platoon, it must be willing 
to dedicate a significant portion of its assets to ensure that resupply is responsive and 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
81 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY 
This research set out to explore the logistical implications of the Marine Corps’ 
distributed operations (DO) platoon concept which is being developed by the Marine 
Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL).  Through the development of a realistic scenario and 
simulation based on MCWL’s DO Wargame, a thorough experiment and analysis, and a 
determination of the support requirements and a support concept, this thesis produced a 
detailed quantitative analysis of the challenges of supporting a DO platoon.  The 
simulated operational experience generated by this analysis will form a strong foundation 
for the further development of the DO concept and will be useful to any logistician in a 
position to support a DO platoon. 
 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The goal of this research was to answer three questions: 
• What are the critical logistical factors relating to mission success for the 
DO platoon in the missions envisioned in MCWL’s Wargame Scenarios? 
• What are the critical logistical capabilities of the MEU that will enable it 
to provide continuous sustainment to a distributed force? 
• What is the supportability of a DO platoon across the range of missions? 
In this section, the answers to these questions are briefly summarized. 
 
1. Critical Factors 
The simulation experiment results are analyzed using multiple regression to 
identify critical factors.  The two most critical logistical factors for supporting the DO 
platoon are tied directly to responsiveness.  They are the time it takes to setup a resupply 
mission and the time it takes to deliver it.  The analysis results suggest that if setup time 
can be kept less than four hours and resupply flight time is less than 15 minutes, then the 
platoon’s average mission performance is better overall.  The number of days of supply 
(DOS) is also important and three DOS is the threshold value for better performance.  
Adding more days of supply increases performance, but logistical analysis suggests that 
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more than three DOS is too much for an individual Marine to carry.  Also critical is the 
usage rate of supplies in a fight.  The amount of supplies that a Marine uses in an 
engagement can be much higher than normal planning factors suggest, especially for fuel, 
water, ammunition, and medical supplies.  The statistical analysis suggests that if this 
usage rate deviates significantly from the planned factors, then a more responsive request 
system is required to maintain effectiveness.  Overall, enemy capabilities are incredibly 
significant since a more powerful enemy introduces greater instability in the usage of 
supplies and ammunition and in the casualty rate. 
 
2. Critical Capabilities 
The critical capabilities that are required to support a DO platoon are also defined 
through analysis of the simulation results using regression and classification trees 
combined with data visualization.  Based on the scenarios that were explored in the 
experiment, the most effective logistical support system includes autonomic, rapid 
request, and scheduled support missions.  This system is made more effective by 
providing aircraft that can provide surveillance over the DO platoon’s landing zones 
during resupply missions.  An autonomic logistics system works well for combat usage 
and casualty rates that are low and relatively stable, but a rapid request system is much 
more robust over the range of possible combat environments.  Stealth is a potentially 
important component of low risk resupply missions. 
 
3. Supportability 
An effective logistical support system for the mission in the DO wargame 
scenario is sustainable from the current MEU.  Two CH-46 and two AH-1 helicopters in 
direct support can provide the DO platoon with its required support by flying scheduled 
(every two days) and rapid request missions from a location within 50 kilometers of the 
DO platoon.  Three DOS is the recommended combat load of supplies for the platoon and 
is within their carrying capacity.  Carrying more than three DOS would be very difficult 
without some very strict economy measures. These measures might include water 
reclamation and purification technologies, battery chargers, and strict fuel economy 
standards.  Developing an estimate of supportability for a DO platoon mission requires 
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looking at the MEU’s overall support commitments and the time, distance, and intensity 
of the platoon’s mission.   
 
C. ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS 
This research identifies several additional insights as a by-product of the analysis 
into the research questions.  The three most significant of these are summarized below. 
 
1. Instability 
This research examines critical factors under unstable combat conditions.  
Instability is defined as a very capable enemy force which results in large uncertainties in 
combat usage rates.  In the unstable situation, high resupply speed and low resupply 
stealth were the most important contributors to success.  This shows that responsiveness 
and fire support are critical to the DO platoon.  In the scenario analyzed, resupply 
missions also serve as close air support missions since the resupply aircraft provide 
targeting information.  As a result, this research concludes that quick response for both 
supplies and fire support are critical to the success of the DO platoon, especially when 
faced with great uncertainty. 
 
2. Intelligence 
Tactical intelligence is critical to the combat service support agency when 
supporting DO.  The threat to resupply vehicles in a dispersed environment without 
secure lines of communication increases the risks to all involved.  The supporting agency 
must be able to respond to support requests before the next enemy attack.  Resupply 
missions must have appropriate escorts to ensure safe delivery and return of vehicles.  
Combat service support takes on a much more tactical character when supporting DO.  
This makes intelligence much more critical when planning a resupply mission, both in 
determining the execution and timeline of the mission and in preparing the support that 





3. Simulated Operational Experience 
Usually lessons learned and significant factors are not identified until many 
mistakes are made in the field operationally.  In this research, computer modeling allows 
hundreds of thousands of simulated combat missions to be executed.  By exploring the 
ranges of factors in this simulated combat, there are both mistakes made and things done 
well.  Statistical analysis of the results is like an operational hot wash, where key players 
in an operation meet to discuss the lessons learned from an operation or exercise.  When 
developing new doctrine and tactics, such as DO, there is precious little operational 
experience to draw on to determine what works well and what does not.  While the 
lessons learned from simulation analysis do not automatically translate into operational 
success, they give a good foundation of simulated experience for live operational testing 
and experimentation.  The author of this thesis participated in a Project Albert sponsored 
experiment in which agent-based simulations and data farming were used as part of the 
course of action development phase of the planning process.  During this process, the 
experiment staffs were able to gain a surrogate for operational experience in the tactical 
problem they were working on which helped to improve the quality of their planning.  A 
brief synopsis of the author’s participation in this experiment is contained in Appendix D.  
In summary, computer simulation and data farming is a valuable way to gain a 
foundation of experience in operational problems.  
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Based on the conclusions of this thesis, several recommendations are made below: 
 
1. Supporting a DO platoon 
• Water is the biggest limiting factor in increasing DOS for the DO platoon.  
It is recommended that research be done into ways to reduce the water 
requirement by reclaiming waste water and capturing the water in engine 
exhaust. 
• The DO platoon could be resupplied by air delivery provided it is in range 
of casualty evacuation aircraft.  It is recommended that technologies for 
precision airdrop from the C-130 or MV-22 be explored for delivering 
tactical resupply packages to DO units in a clandestine manner. 
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• The risk of a DO platoon operation increases with the length of time it 
takes for supporting aircraft to reach it.  This research estimates that a 15 
minute or less time of flight is effective and gives an operational radius of 
approximately 50 kilometers using the CH-46. Poor flight conditions or 
bad weather may limit this radius. It is recommended that operational 
constraints for DO be developed that account for the travel time of aircraft 
carrying critical supplies or performing medical evacuation.   
• Aerial surveillance of the DO platoon’s area during resupply deliveries 
proved to be very valuable in the simulation model.  It is recommended 
that a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle be considered for employment with 
the DO platoon. 
• Autonomic logistics was useful in supporting the DO platoon in the 
simulation, but a rapid request system was more critical overall in 
responding to high demand variability.  It is recommended that 
intelligence and communications assets of the supporting agency be 
tailored to provide the maximum amount intelligence on usage rates and 
enemy activity in order to provide the supporting agency maximum 
flexibility in executing both push and pull logistics. 
 
2. Methodological 
• The use of data farming and simulation analysis of the problem before 
identifying physical logistical constraints allowed a direct assessment of 
the tradeoffs among factors and policies before preconceived ideas of 
support constraints were established in this research.  It is recommended 
that simulation studies in logistics freely explore factors and policies that 
are not feasible in the real world in order to assess the cost of mistakes and 
the value of good policy. 
• This simulation study helped to develop a surrogate for operational 
experience in a new tactical concept that is critical to USMC 
transformation.  It is recommended that the methodology of this thesis be 
applied to other USMC and Department of Defense transformation efforts 
in order to guide the development of new doctrine, tactics, equipment, 
training, and live experimentation.  
 
E. FOLLOW-ON WORK 
The following is a list of follow-on research of value that could be accomplished 
utilizing this work: 
• More detailed data analysis of the results of each of the five scenarios in 
the simulation 
• Focused analysis over the key parameters and ranges identified including 
more factorial experiments 
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• Repeat analysis using a scenario from an actual DO platoon operational 
exercise 
• Analysis of the effects of enemy attack on resupply aircraft 
• Analysis of effects of the terrain in the model 
• Analysis of the effects of different enemy characteristics and arrival rates 
on the results of the simulation 
• Analysis of the utility of adding unmanned aerial vehicles to the DO 
platoon equipment list 
• Analysis of the effect of imperfect communication with the CSS agency in 
the simulation 
• Analysis of the effect of incomplete resupply missions on the effectiveness 
of the DO platoon in the simulation 
• A more detailed analysis of the effect of distance on the supportability of 
the DO platoon 
 
The following is a list of follow-on research of value stemming from this 
research: 
• Validation/comparison of the MANA simulation results and 
recommendations with the results and recommendations of MCWL’s live 
experiments 
• Development of a model exploring the potential casualty rates sustained 
by the DO platoon and their relationship to logistical support 
• Further research into the utility of using simulation to develop synthetic 
operational experience in new doctrine and tactics 
• Human factors study of the effects of carrying heavy loads of supplies on 
the effectiveness of the DO platoon 
• Comparison of MANA simulation results in this thesis with a similar 
scenario created in a different combat modeling environment 
• Analysis of the utility of stealth precision air delivery methods in support 
of the DO platoon 
The two highest priority research areas for follow-on work are as follows: 
 
1. Dispersed Logistics 
In the development of DO and other future tactics, secure lines of communication 
are becoming rarer.  Most current logistical systems are based on throughput, which puts 
security in a secondary role.  This research addresses the risk to the mission of the DO 
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platoon caused by poor logistics.  Since poor logistics can cripple a distributed force, it is 
important that supply deliveries operate securely and safely.  An important follow on 
study for this research would be to assess the consequences of enemy action against 
logistics assets in support of distributed forces. 
 
2. Data Farming and Logistics  
Traditionally, combat logistical problems have been addressed by trying to find 
the optimal allocation of assets mathematically.  In a distributed environment, the threats 
to logistical assets are much more uncertain, as are the best ways to support a particular 
mission.  An optimal allocation of logistics assets may not work well across an uncertain 
battlespace.  An important follow on study for this research would be to use data farming 
techniques to develop robust logistical support concepts for other transformational 
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APPENDIX A.  EQUIPMENT LISTS 
 Billet Equipment Description Technology RangeA Command
Plt Commander
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
ETCS/Voice Expeditionary Tactical Comm System Low Earth Orbit Sattelite Worldwide
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi) 7-10mi
Plt Radio Operator
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 117 Squad-Plt-HHQ , CAS, Firecontrol - digital VHF(7-10mi)/UHF(LOS)/Sattelite (WW) 7-10mi
Rifleman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms 500-1000m
Guide
M-16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
PRC 150 Platoon to HHQ comms OTH (logistics) HF/HFDigital 30+ miles
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
ITV Internally Transportable Vehicle Can be transported inside MV-22
PAS-13H Optic for .50 caliber MG
M-2HB .50 Caliber Machine Gun 1830m
Medical Kit Standard First Aid Supplies
B Command Plt Sergeant
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
ETCS/Voice Expeditionary Tactical Comm System Low Earth Orbit Sattelite Worldwide
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi) 7-10mi
Rifleman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 117 Squad-Plt-HHQ , CAS, Firecontrol - digital VHF(7-10mi)/UHF(LOS)/Sattelite (WW) 7-10mi
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
Corpsman
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Adv. Medkit Corpman emergency trauma kit
ITV Internally Transportable Vehicle Can be transported inside MV-22
PAS-13H Optic for Mk-19
MK-19 Automatic 40mm Grenade Launcher 1500m
Medical Kit Standard First Aid Supplies
M16A4 Rifleman suite consists of:
PRR, Bayonet, Bipod, Compass, White/IR Light, 
Suppressor, Bayonet, Collapsable Stock, Day RCO, Night 
RCO
 







 Squad Organization (3 per platoon)
Billet Equipment Description Technology Range
Squad C2
Squad Leader SGT
M16 w/ M203 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite and 40mm grenade launcher
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi)
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
ETCS/Voice Expeditionary Tactical Comm System Low Earth Orbit Sattelite Worldwide
Automatic Rifleman
M249 SAW 5.56 Machine Gun w/ spare barrel 1000m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
ITV
M240G 7.62 Machine Gun 1800m
PVS-17 Night Sight
PRC 117 Squad-Plt-HHQ , CAS, Firecontrol - digital VHF(7-10mi)/UHF(LOS)/Sattelite (WW)
GLTD II Ground Laser Target Designator 10x magnification 20km
Medical Kit Standard First Aid Supplies
Team 1
Team Leader CPL
M16 w/ M203 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite and 40mm grenade launcher 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi)
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
Automatic Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M249 SAW 5.56 Machine Gun w/ spare barrel
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
ITV
M-2HB .50 Caliber Machine Gun 1830m
PAS-13H Optic for M-2
Team 2
Team Leader CPL
M16 w/ M203 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite and 40mm grenade launcher 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
PRC 148 Platoon C2 and Close Air Support UHF(line of sight)/VHF (7-10mi)
PEQ-2 Aiming / Pointing Laser Class 3b Laser Unknown
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
IZLID Infrared Zoom Laser Illuminator/Designator Class 4 Laser 10km
Automatic Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M249 SAW 5.56 Machine Gun w/ spare barrel 1000m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
Rifleman PVT-LCPL
M16A4 5.56 rifle w/ rifleman suite 800m
PRR Personal Role Radio Intra Team Comms UHF 500-1000m
ITV
MK-19 Autmatic 40mm Grenade Launcher 1500m
PAS-13H Optic for Mk-19  
This is the equipment list of an individual DO squad. 
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APPENDIX B. MANA SIMULATION PARAMETER DATA 
This appendix contains the spreadsheets used to develop and document the 
simulation parameters used in this research.  For a copy of the source code of the 
simulation, contact Dr. Tom Lucas, Associate Professor of Operations Research at the 
















































































































































































































































































































































 General Simulation parameters 
Time Step 30 Seconds
MAP SCALE
X Y JUSTIFICATION
Number of Cells 200 200 6000mx6000m corresponds to Bridgeport region
used in Sea Viking DO Wargame 1 Scenario 2
Real World Min (m) 0 0 Aggregation into 200x200 cells is to allow simulation
Real World Max 6000 6000 to run faster out to a simulation time of 14 days to
simulate logistics system
Add new contacts By Agent ID Faster, works well (no significant difference in MOE)
Faster and results similar to removing by underlying
contact ID (difference not significant)
LOS Mode Advanced take into account terrain effects of mountains
1 Default Setting 
1 Cell is 30 meters. Increasing has significant effects.
Contacts 30+ meters apart would be considered 
different for targeting purposes
5 Tried several parameters, this seems to work as well
as larger numbers for the aggration level of this model.
This amounts to a 150m sample out of 1000m
Move Selection default, not explored
Best Move Precision default for ground forces, not explored
Move Precision Varies
Genral Movement Settings NO Multiple Agents in Cell (blue agents)
YES Multiple Agents in Cell (red agents)
YES Diagonal Motion Correction
YES Navigate Obstacles
NO Squad Moves Together
YES Going affects speed / except aviation units
Stephen Algorithm
Shoot SA Map 
Contacts By
Location on SA map
Contact Resolution 
Radius
Number of Cells 










 MANA DO Scenario Comm Architecture
Entity Passes Information to: (Real World) Explanation
DO Fireteams All Squad Members / Squad HQ Voice, PRR, VHF, UHF, Sattelite
Squad has a common picture 
based on internal 
communication using voice, 
signals, and personal role radios
DO Rifle Squads Platoon HQ, Squad Members PRR, VHF, UHF, Sattelite
Reports squad situational 
awareness (SA) to platoon.
DO Platoon HQ (A&B)
MEU Cdr, Fire Support, Squads, Combat 
Service Support Agency (Log Sensor) VHF, UHF, Sattelite
Consoliodates and reports 
squad SA from three squads. 
Relays platoon SA to squads 
and Higher.  
Blue Re-supply Agents
Blue Plt Headquarters (A&B), Other 
Resupply Agents UHF / VHF 
Pass mission tasking to each 
other to coordinate launch.  
Pass battlefield awareness to 
ground forces obtained from 
their vantage point.
Blue Fire Support
Implicit Communication with requesting 
agency PRR, VHF, UHF, Sattelite
Fire support agency receives 
targets from blue squads via a 
common operating pictures. 
Fires are controlled to avoid 
fratricide.
Blue Logistic Sensor 
(CSSA)
Resupply Agents (passes taskings and 
requests) internal lines (ship or CSSA)
An agent senses when friendlies 
are out of fuel and sends a 
message to resupply agents 
triggering a mission
Enemy Forces
internal to small groups (Squad SA only) and 
refueling used to trigger hiding
VHF, commercial radios, cell phone, 
sattelite phones
Small groups trying to infiltrate 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Blue ResupplBlue DO Infantry Squad
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1 Default State 
-30 30
5 Shot At (Pri) -20 20 20
15 Squad En Contact -30 30
26 Fuel Out -20 20 20
28 Refuelled by Anyone 
30 Refuel By Friend 
49 Spares 1 
-20 20 20
1 Default State -10 10
5 Shot At (Pri) -20 20 20
15 Squad En Contact -10 10
26 Fuel Out -20 20 20
28 Refuelled by Anyone 
30 Refuel By Friend 
49 Spares 1 -20 20 20
1 Default State 100
2 Reach Waypoint 100 100
31 Refuel By Neutral 100
35 Reach Final Waypoint 100










1 Default State 
1 Default State 
26 Fuel Out 
28 Refuelled by Anyone 
43 Inorg SA En Contact 1 
47 Inorg SA Ne Contact 



















































































































































































1 Default State 
1 1 3 0 111 1 0 100 2 34 34 2 1
5 Shot At (Pri) 3 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 3 3 2 3
15 Squad En Contact 2 1 3 0 111 1 0 100 2 34 34 2 2
26 Fuel Out 3 0 3 0 20 1 0 100 2 3 3 2 0
28 Refuelled by Anyone 1 1 3 0 100 1 0 100 2 167 167 2 0 167 0 100 100
30 Refuel By Friend 1 1 3 0 100 1 0 100 2 167 167 2 0 167 0 100 100
49 Spares 1 
3 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 3 3 2 1
1 Default State 1 1 3 0 111 1 0 100 2 34 34 2 1 0 0 0 0
5 Shot At (Pri) 3 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 3 3 2 3 0 0 0 0
15 Squad En Contact 2 1 3 0 111 1 0 100 2 34 34 2 2 0 0 0 0
26 Fuel Out 3 0 3 0 20 1 0 100 2 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0
28 Refuelled by Anyone 1 1 3 0 100 1 0 100 2 167 167 2 0 167 0 100 100
30 Refuel By Friend 1 1 3 0 100 1 0 100 2 167 167 2 0 167 0 100 100
49 Spares 1 3 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
1 Default State 8 1 1 0 550 1 0 10 2 167 167 100 0 10 0 100 100
2 Reach Waypoint 83 1 1 0 50 1 0 10 2 167 167 2 0 40 0 100 100
31 Refuel By Neutral 8 1 1 0 550 1 0 10 2 167 167 100 0 34 0 100 100
35 Reach Final Waypoint 58 1 1 0 0 1 0 10 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0










1 Default State 
13 1 3 0 0 1 100 10 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
1 Default State 12 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 34 34 255 1 0 0 0 0
26 Fuel Out 37 0 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 50 50 255 0 10 0 100 0
28 Refuelled by Anyone 12 0 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 0 0 255 0 0 0 0 0
43 Inorg SA En Contact 1 12 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 0 0 255 2 0 0 0 0
47 Inorg SA Ne Contact 12 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 34 34 255 0 0 0 0 0
49 Spares 1 14 1 3 0 0 1 0 100 2 34 34 255 10000 0 0 0 0














































































Min Targetr Treat Level
Max Target Threat Level









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 Default State -30 50 80 100
5 Shot At (Pri) -50 50 50
6 Shot At (Sec) -50 50 50
8 Enemy Contact 1 100 100
10 Enemy Contact 3 -50 50 50
19 Injured -30 50 100
28 Refuelled by Anyone -30 50 -100
35 Reach Final Waypoint 50
36 Run Start 50






































































































































1 Default State 26 3 3 1 111 1 20 0 17 34 34 2 0 0 0 0 0
5 Shot At (Pri) 101 3 3 1 222 1 20 0 17 34 34 2 0 0 0 0 0
6 Shot At (Sec) 101 3 3 1 222 1 20 0 17 34 34 2 0 34 0 95 0
8 Enemy Contact 1 101 3 3 1 222 1 20 0 17 34 34 2 0 34 0 95 0
10 Enemy Contact 3 101 3 3 1 222 1 20 0 17 34 34 2 0 34 0 95 0
19 Injured 26 3 3 1 111 1 20 0 17 17 17 2 0 0 0 0 0
28 Refuelled by Anyone 26 3 3 1 111 1 100 100 17 17 17 2 0 0 0 0 0
35 Reach Final Waypoint 112 3 3 1 0 1 100 100 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
36 Run Start 117 2 3 1 0 1 100 100 2 17 17 2 0 0 0 0 0












Red individual weapons are the same as blue DO squads 
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APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS 
The following are the factors and maximum ranges that are explored in the 
simulation experiments.  Decision factors are in yellow. 
Factor Value Range Explanation 
DO Platoon Days of Supply 1..5 The amount of supplies, in days, carried into initial deployment 
Scheduled Resupply Days 1..5 The number of days between scheduled resupply missions 
Consumption rate when in   
enemy contact (fuel/step) 1..100 
Consumption rate of blue squads when in contact with the 
enemy 
Consumption rate when shot at 
(fuel / step) 1..100 
Consumption rate of blue squads when in direct contact (i.e. 
in a fire fight with the enemy) 
Rapid request setup time (min) 1..360 Time, in minutes, from time of request to time of resupply unit departure from combat service support area 
Time to conduct resupply (min) 1..60 Time, in minutes, to execute the transfer of supplies and casualties when the resupply unit arrives at DO platoon 
Resupply speed (m/s) 5..100 Movement speed, in meters per second, of the Resupply force
Resupply stealth (rate per time 
step) 0..100 Concealment rate  of resupply force per time step 
Resupply sensor range 34..167 Sensor detection and classification range, in meters, of resupply force 
Inorganic sensor persistence 
friendly (min) 1..120 
Time, in minutes, a blue force sensor will maintain a 
previously reported track of an enemy agent 
Sense and respond lead time 
(hrs) 0..12 
The amount of lead time built into the sense and respond 
(autonomic logistics) system in hours 
Enemy Sensor Range (m) 90..2040 Sensor range, in meters, of the enemy’s sensors 
Enemy Squad Size 1..20 Number of agents in an enemy squad 
Contact Persistence Enemy 
(min) 1..120 
Time, in minutes, enemy forces will continually track a blue 
agent 











1. DEBUGGING DESIGN 
  low level 1 1 1 1 2 2 50 0 34 1 3 1 3 1 1high level 5 5 100 100 720 120 1000 100 167 240 68 20 68 240 10













n rate Shot 

































EN Hits to 
Kill
ANA Factor Fuel tank







































EN ctc 1 
and 2 
states
ID1 4 1 37 33 92 92 807 48 163 173 39 19 15 150 8
ID2 5 4 12 43 249 32 570 75 130 221 53 10 18 83 4
ID3 5 2 95 23 215 103 198 45 88 139 55 18 33 124 3
ID4 4 5 72 46 47 52 302 27 51 236 62 13 8 50 9
ID5 5 3 20 3 69 20 288 61 115 117 7 17 45 143 7
ID6 3 5 24 49 114 79 184 86 152 27 29 16 61 16 3
ID7 4 2 54 4 182 41 896 42 55 106 25 18 65 177 2
ID8 4 4 92 32 271 111 718 2 67 76 4 13 50 8 6
ID9 4 1 3 81 294 74 421 9 140 72 58 8 24 57 6
ID10 5 4 49 77 2 35 926 38 123 1 47 2 30 203 1
ID11 3 1 97 54 148 54 347 69 36 57 50 5 17 12 3
ID12 5 3 69 92 125 9 406 81 76 91 38 6 32 139 9
ID13 3 2 33 64 282 59 228 28 161 229 12 2 67 42 7
ID14 4 3 43 89 193 116 95 0 103 128 19 7 37 162 5
ID15 3 2 78 95 316 28 495 94 53 199 3 9 66 72 6
ID16 4 3 55 72 103 114 1000 56 94 195 26 3 48 236 9
ID17 4 3 40 13 484 120 792 97 111 143 23 6 29 154 7
ID18 3 4 27 35 417 55 837 80 82 177 10 1 3 20 4
ID19 4 3 57 30 563 107 80 41 105 191 34 2 16 210 1
ID20 3 4 86 7 395 22 466 17 142 210 6 9 14 61 5
ID21 4 2 41 10 709 46 65 70 73 23 30 4 43 195 10
ID22 4 4 1 16 372 85 510 89 57 83 63 7 51 35 5
ID23 5 3 80 26 698 17 733 13 109 79 40 6 40 132 3
ID24 3 5 83 38 496 65 599 22 167 16 49 5 59 53 9
ID25 4 2 10 60 585 89 941 16 46 38 20 13 11 1 9
ID26 4 4 16 100 552 24 659 36 84 109 5 17 25 135 1
ID27 4 1 75 80 383 109 362 95 136 61 17 12 22 27 5
ID28 5 4 63 83 664 39 169 66 132 87 27 20 7 173 7
ID29 5 2 13 61 462 26 436 8 63 206 60 11 62 76 7
ID30 4 5 35 74 641 118 377 53 42 188 43 14 58 147 3
ID31 4 2 71 57 686 50 777 77 157 233 56 11 52 23 2
ID32 5 4 94 86 518 78 911 67 121 147 57 16 44 128 8
ID33 3 3 51 51 361 61 525 50 101 121 36 11 36 121 6
ID34 2 5 64 68 630 30 243 52 38 68 32 2 56 91 3
ID35 1 2 89 58 473 91 480 25 71 20 18 11 53 158 7
ID36 1 4 6 78 507 19 852 55 113 102 16 3 38 117 8
ID37 2 1 29 55 675 70 748 73 150 5 9 8 63 191 2
ID38 1 3 81 98 653 102 763 39 86 124 64 4 26 98 4
ID39 3 1 77 52 608 43 866 14 49 214 42 5 10 225 8
ID40 2 4 47 97 541 81 154 58 146 135 46 3 6 64 9
ID41 2 2 9 69 451 11 332 98 134 165 67 8 21 233 5
ID42 2 5 98 20 428 48 629 91 61 169 13 13 47 184 5
ID43 1 2 52 24 720 87 124 63 78 240 24 19 41 38 10
ID44 3 5 4 47 574 68 703 31 165 184 21 16 54 229 8
ID45 1 3 32 9 597 113 644 19 125 150 33 15 39 102 2
ID46 3 4 68 37 440 63 822 72 40 12 59 19 4 199 4
ID47 2 3 58 12 529 6 955 100 98 113 52 14 34 79 6
ID48 3 4 23 6 406 94 555 6 148 42 68 12 5 169 5
ID49 2 3 46 29 619 8 50 44 107 46 45 18 23 5 2
ID50 2 3 61 88 238 2 258 3 90 98 48 15 42 87 4
ID51 3 2 74 66 305 67 213 20 119 64 61 20 68 221 7
ID52 2 3 44 71 159 15 970 59 96 50 37 19 55 31 10
ID53 3 2 15 94 327 100 584 83 59 31 65 12 57 180 6
ID54 2 4 60 91 13 76 985 30 128 218 41 17 28 46 1
ID55 2 2 100 85 350 37 540 11 144 158 8 14 20 206 6
ID56 1 3 21 75 24 105 317 88 92 162 31 15 31 109 8
ID57 3 1 18 63 226 57 451 78 34 225 22 16 12 188 2
ID58 3 4 91 41 137 33 109 84 155 203 51 8 60 240 2
ID59 2 3 85 1 170 98 391 64 117 132 66 4 46 106 10
ID60 2 5 26 21 339 13 688 5 65 180 54 9 49 214 6
ID61 1 2 38 18 58 83 881 34 69 154 44 1 64 68 4
ID62 1 4 88 40 260 96 614 92 138 35 11 10 9 165 4
ID63 2 1 66 27 81 4 673 47 159 53 28 7 13 94 8
ID64 2 5 30 44 36 72 273 23 44 8 15 10 19 218 9












2. EXPLORATORY DESIGN 
Here is the debugged factor list: 
Factor Number Decision Factors Squads Low Level High Level Mana factor Mana Low Mana High
1 DO Squad Days of Supply 1,2,3,4,5,10 1 5 Fuel tank 2880 14400
2 Scheduled Resupply Days 6,7,8 1 5
Reach final 
Waypoint 
time in state 2880 14400
3
Consumption rate En contact 





Consumption rate Shot at (fuel 
/ step) 1,2,3,4,5 1 50
Shot At state 
fuel rate 1 50
5
Rapid Request Setup time 
(min) 10 1 360
Spare 1 time 
in state 2 720
6 Time to conduct resupply (min) 1,2,3,4,5 1 60
Spare 1 time 
in state 2 120
















Inorganic sensor persistance 










12 Enemy Squad Size 11,…,90 1 20 num agents 1 14
13
Contact Persistance Enemy 




14 EN Hits to Kill 11,…,90 1 10
default and 
EN ctc 1 
and 2 states 1 5  
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The final exploratory design is the Cartesian product of the two NOLH’s listed 




low level 1 1 1 1 2 2 50 0 34 2
high level 5 5 50 50 720 120 1000 100 167 120













n rate Shot 























1 5 1 22 10 630 76 703 47 167 83
2 5 5 7 19 339 24 763 31 155 54
3 5 3 45 9 24 72 733 3 76 116
4 3 5 50 21 675 20 822 6 92 13
5 5 1 24 12 496 87 436 56 42 17
6 5 5 16 15 316 28 198 88 38 65
7 4 3 48 13 2 79 406 91 150 2
8 3 4 47 18 653 32 258 100 105 113
9 4 2 12 27 518 39 50 19 113 72
10 4 4 15 35 159 65 139 38 146 24
11 4 2 38 48 249 9 169 16 84 76
12 4 4 33 47 541 116 495 41 63 20
13 3 2 10 29 428 17 970 78 80 35
14 4 3 19 44 114 68 941 72 67 94
15 4 2 42 45 271 2 673 75 130 43
16 4 4 30 50 585 109 584 66 142 91
17 3 3 26 26 361 61 525 50 101 61
18 1 5 29 41 92 46 347 53 34 39
19 1 1 44 32 383 98 288 69 46 68
20 2 3 6 42 698 50 317 97 125 6
21 3 2 1 30 47 102 228 94 109 109
22 1 5 27 39 226 35 614 44 159 105
23 1 1 35 36 406 94 852 13 163 57
24 2 3 3 38 720 43 644 9 51 120
25 3 2 4 33 69 91 792 0 96
26 2 4 39 24 204 83 1000 81 88 50
27 2 2 36 16 563 57 911 63 55 98
28 2 4 13 3 473 113 881 84 117 46
29 2 2 18 4 182 6 555 59 138 102
30 3 4 41 22 294 105 80 22 121 87
31 2 3 32 7 608 54 109 28 134 28
32 3 4 9 6 451 120 377 25 71 79
33 2 3 21 1 137 13 466 34 59 32
9
Noise Factors
low level 3 1 2 1












EN Hits to 
Kill
1 23 14 98 3
2 7 4 105 3
3 11 7 9 2
4 15 9 39 5
5 52 13 54 2
6 68 5 46 4
7 44 3 120 2
8 40 12 91 5
9 36 8 61 3
10 48 1 24 4
11 64 11 17 3
12 60 8 113 4
13 56 6 83 1
14 19 2 68 5
15 3 10 76 2
16 27 12 2 4
17 31 3 32 1  
3. LARGE SCALE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 














68 3 30 2
68 7 30 2
68 13 30 2  





Crossed with fifteen levels of scheduled resupply policy: 















5 5  































1 35 451 24 941 25 167 16
4 13 630 68 50 31 167 75
7 22 47 32 644 81 167 120
10 32 226 120 584 13 167 90
13 4 406 105 703 100 167 23
16 50 585 46 288 94 167 68
19 41 2 83 169 56 167 8
22 7 182 9 228 38 167 38
26 26 361 61 525 50 167 61
29 44 541 113 822 63 167 83
32 10 720 39 881 44 167 113
35 1 137 76 763 6 167 53
38 47 316 17 347 0 167 98
41 19 496 2 466 88 167 31
44 29 675 91 406 19 167 1
47 38 92 54 1000 69 167 46
50 16 271 98 109 75 167 105  
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APPENDIX D. SIMULATION IN COURSE OF ACTION 
ANALYSIS 
Course of action (COA) development, wargaming, and analysis is one of the most 
critical portions of the Marine Corps Planning Process.  Determining likely enemy tactics 
and creating friendly plans to exploit them provide the commander with a set of tactical 
options to accomplish his assigned mission.  One could envision a virtually endless 
landscape of possible COAs from the simple to the ridiculous.  History has shown that 
often it is the audacious or unexpected plan that leads to victory.  The problem then 
becomes, with finite time to plan for seemingly infinite possibilities, how can a 
commander be sure that his staff has explored a wide range of potential COAs when they 
typically only have time to develop two or three?  I recently participated in an experiment 
headed by Col Darryl Stanley from I MEF at the Project Albert International Workshop 
10 in Stockholm, Sweden in May of 2005, where we explored a potential solution to this 
problem. The purpose of this paper is to briefly summarize this experience and then 
compare and contrast it with a more deliberate course of action analysis process that I 
participated in through the Wargaming Analysis class in the Operations Research 
Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
The experiment we conducted in Stockholm was designed to allow a red staff and 
a blue staff to quickly develop numerous COAs which were then input into a computer 
simulation model and explored in order to provide feedback to the staff in their decision 
making process. The model used was MANA (Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata), 
developed by the New Zealand Defense Technology Agency. The MANA model is 
relatively simple compared to some of the more detailed combat models like 
CASTFOREM or JCATS (Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation), but it still attempts to 
capture the key aspects of combat, including terrain, communication, fire support, 
movement, and unit behaviors. The advantage of the MANA model is that model setup 
and runtime is relatively short compared to other highly detailed combat models. My role 
as part of the red cell was to model the various red COAs and use the model to help the 
red staff analyze the affects of key terrain and mobility issues. Over the course of the one 
week experiment, we were able to create and analyze seven different red COAs and 
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compare them across seven blue COAs over numerous sets of battlefield conditions.  The 
key insights gained by the staff during this process were an appreciation for key terrain, 
the time and space issues of battlefield maneuver, the value of armor and artillery 
support, and the dangers of assuming too much about enemy intentions. The goal of the 
simulation process was not to tell the staff which plan would work better in real life, but 
simply to help them through their decision process by challenging their intuition and 
allowing them to see the consequences of some of their planning assumptions.  
In the Wargaming Analysis class (designator OA 4604) at NPS, we split the class 
into a red and blue staff in order to exercise the COA development and wargaming 
process, in preparation for a large scale, highly detailed, simulated wargame which we 
played in JCATS. The staff planning process was conducted in the traditional manner, 
using maps, intelligence summaries, enemy order of battler, et cetera. I was a member of 
the blue staff and we developed three courses of action and decided on one based on the 
results of a wargame that we played verbally on a map.  The culmination of the course 
was for the red and blue staffs to put their forces into JCATS and conduct a live, human 
in the loop, wargame, red versus blue.  In this process, the setup time was very long, and 
the learning curve on controlling the various entities in the model was slow.  In the final 
execution of the game, individual operator error on the part of the students had as much 
affect on the outcome as did the number of infantry divisions, or the quality of the plans.  
Ultimately, the setup time (which was several days including training time) and the 
playing complexity limited the utility of game as a planning support tool.  
I am not trying to downplay the utility of JCATS as a tool for training staff 
coordination or to advocate the use of MANA in the planning process, but my recent 
experience in this class and in Stockholm has led me to some conclusions about the 
utility and employment of simulations in support of COA development, wargaming, and 
analysis. Here they are in no particular order: 
1) No simulation or wargame can tell the staff what will happen if a particular 
COA is chosen, but it can identify many of the strengths and weaknesses of a particular 
plan, as well as provide some assessment of the risk against various enemy COAs.  It 
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must be kept in mind that there are limits to every model and combat simulations will not 
identify every risk, or make up for lazy staff work. 
2) If the modelers and/or game controllers become too close to the staff, it is 
tempting to try to game the system by taking advantage of known model limits.  It is, 
however, useful for model experts to be able to use the model to help the staff position 
forces and assess terrain and obstacles.  
3) Building a robust combat model can be a time consuming and iterative process. 
The more that is done before the planning process begins, the more useful the simulation 
support will be to the staff. 
4) A wargame is only one realization of the possible outcomes of a particular 
COA. Repeated simulations, which can be done in Project Albert’s data farming 
environment, can give a better impression of the risks and benefits of a course of action.  
5) If simulation is used as part of an iterative COA development process, the red 
cell order of battle (or set of possible orders of battle) should remain fixed (if possible) 
throughout the process. For example, it is hard to assess the advantage of changing 
friendly COAs or friendly order of battle if the enemy is constantly changing.  One 
technique that could be used would be to develop the blue COA against a particular order 
of battle and then vary the numbers or combat power of the enemy force in order to 
assess the consequences of imperfect intelligence.  
6) Game player skill and modeler ability level can have significant affects on the 
outcome of simulations and wargames and must be controlled by an umpire cell.  
In summary, I would recommend that further research be done in this area.  I 
believe that combat simulations can be an incredibly valuable part of the planning 
process, as long as it can be done relatively efficiently so as not to interfere with a time 
constrained process.  Complex multiplayer wargames are useful for training the staff in 
the execution of the selected course of action, but simpler models, explored over many 
parameters, can be great tools to help the staff develop and analyze COAs.  The result is a 
set of thoroughly explored and analyzed COAs which will help the commander to make 
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APPENDIX E. MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY 
TISDALE COMPETITION PRESENTATION 
The following are slides from a presentation of this research at the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Military Operations Research Society Tisdale Award Competition.  
This thesis was one of four finalists selected for the competition based on the potential 
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